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This thesis examines the effects of the anti-deforestation programs on Brazil’s economic 
sustainability goals and the related effects on the objectives for sustainable development 
of the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and the European Union (EU). Specifically, it 
asks whether the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), if 
implemented in Brazil in order to achieve a reduction in greenhouse gases, runs counter 
to the development and sustainability objectives of the Strategic Partnership with the EU 
and may, in fact, slow progress on the reduction of poverty. Can Brazil pursue all of these 
policy objectives at once?  
Although Brazil produces most of its energy with renewable resources, massive 
problems in deforestation still occur. The thesis expands in detail on the climatic 
objectives and the economic relations within the strategic transatlantic relationship. The 
climatic goals are presented in depth, and the impact on sustainable economy and 
development are examined through two specific CDM projects and their effects on the 
economic development objectives of the Brazilian government. 
In addition, the results of the CDM project comparison are overlaid on the 
sustainable development objectives of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and 
Brazil. Are the achievements of the project objectives in line with the objectives of the 
Strategic Partnership goals concerning the topic of sustainability in climate change, 
economy, and development? 
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The world’s climate is changing. While scholars and politicians continue to argue 
about what causes this change and what the world might expect from it, climate change 
now forms a major consideration of domestic and international policy. The overarching 
project connecting the Brazilian efforts is the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is one of the chief instruments 
for tackling climate change, most demonstrably by obliging industrialized countries to 
reduce their emissions of certain greenhouse gases, which are responsible for global 
warming. 
In Brazil, which signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 and ratified it in 2002, several 
schemes are being implemented to curb deforestation, such as the Program for Protection 
of Amazon Areas, also called the Sustainable Amazon Program. As the Brazilian 
government stated in its National Program on Climate Change, the topic of climate 
change is a strategic issue for both the present and the future of national development.1 
For the Brazilian administration, climate change is not just a question of productive and 
technological choices. It is also a matter of the preservation and, whenever possible, the 
increase in the competitiveness of the economy and of Brazilian products in a globalized 
world. 
The European Union (EU) is also very concerned about the effects of climate 
change in Brazil. According to the EU Country Strategy Paper, climate change is likely to 
affect Brazil’s natural ecosystems: “There are indications that global climate change and 
deforestation may lead to major shifts in the hydrological system of the Amazon, with 
potentially catastrophic consequences for the rainforest and the whole region.”2 The Joint 
Action Plan between Brazil and the EU calls for the signatories to make concerted efforts 
to support strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth in the context of the Group 
1Government of Brazil, Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, Decree No. 6263 of 
November 21, 2007, National Plan on Climate Change (Brasilia, 2008), 7. 
2Europäische Kommission [European Commission], Brasilien: Länderstrategiepapier 2007‒2013 
[Brazil: Country Strategy Paper 2007‒2013] (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), 12. 
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of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20) Framework for Growth, 
to ensure the effective reform of financial markets, efficient commodity markets, and 
appropriate reforms of the international monetary system. Both partners consider 
economic stability a top priority in their regional objectives. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Brazil is emerging as a global player with an exceptional economic performance. 
This development entails increasing social and environmental responsibilities for the 
Brazilian government. However, Brazil now may be caught between conflicting—
possibly mutually exclusive—treaty obligations. To comply with the climate change 
objectives of the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil has taken steps to limit deforestation and thus 
regulates the economic exploitation of natural resources. On the other hand, Brazil’s 
Strategic Partnership with the European Union calls for sustainable economic 
development, which seems to militate against such regulation. 
This thesis examines the effects of the anti-deforestation programs on Brazil’s 
economic sustainability goals and the related effects on the objectives for sustainable 
development (SD) of the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and the EU. Specifically, it 
asks whether the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), if 
implemented in Brazil in order to achieve a reduction in greenhouse gases, runs counter 
to the development and sustainability objectives of the Strategic Partnership with the EU 
and might, in fact, slow progress on the reduction of poverty. Can Brazil pursue all of 
these policy objectives at once? 
The thesis expands in detail on the climatic objectives and the economic relations 
within the strategic transatlantic relationship between Brazil and the EU. The climatic 
goals are presented in depth, as are the effects on sustainable economy and development. 
I examine two specific projects of the CDM and analyze their effects on the economic 
development objectives of the Brazilian government. The selected projects are two 
reforestation programs that have been in the CDM market for more than six years. These 
two projects recommend themselves because the availability of general project data 
 2 
concerning the costs, the environmental effects, and the climate implications is very 
good.  
In addition, the results of the CDM project comparison are examined against the 
sustainable development objectives of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and 
Brazil. Are the achievements of the project objectives in line with the objectives of the 
Strategic Partnership goals concerning the topic of sustainability in climate change, 
economy, and development? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Brazil is facing a twofold problem. On the one hand, Brazil is causing enormous 
greenhouse gas emissions, and the reduction of these greenhouse gases emissions is high 
on the national climate agenda.3 On the other hand, Brazil as an emerging world power 
seeks to provide its population a reasonable standard of living. The successful 
combination of these objectives—reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and reduction of 
poverty—presents Brazil with enormous challenges. The issue becomes even more 
complicated when the goals of the Strategic Partnership are taken into account. These 
obligations plus Brazil´s ambitions to stabilize and enhance its position on the global 
stage suggest that the sustainable development will have higher priority than the 
commitments to climate change projects. 
There are a number of reasons why Europe should be interested in establishing an 
even greater cooperation with Brazil and to position itself as a political partner for future 
dialogues. First, Europe should approach the South American country as a partner for the 
design of regional and global processes. For instance, the EU and Brazil could pursue 
opportunities for a closer coordination within the Peace Building Commission of the 
United Nations (UN). But it is also in the enlightened self-interest of Europe to engage 
more than in the past with an emerging economic power with increasing technological 
and scientific skills. Various studies predict massive shifts in the global economic and 
political power in the coming decades. The Asian “anchor” countries, as well as Russia, 
3Susanne Gratius and Debora González, “The EU and Brazil: Shared Goals, Different Strategies,” in 
Hot Issues, Cold Shoulders, Lukewarm Partners: EU Strategic Partnerships and Climate Change, ed. 
Giovanni Grevi and Thomas Renard (Madrid: FRIDE, 2012), 13. 
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Brazil, and probably South Africa and Turkey are becoming increasingly dynamic, 
greatly increasing their share of global production of goods and services in world trade 
and investment flows. Moreover, global demographic trends presage a relative loss of 
importance of Europe as a whole. A strong decline in population in Europe will make it 
increasingly difficult to maintain a strong position in the global dialogue with countries 
such as Brazil. Of particular importance to Europe’s partnership with Brazil: Brazil is a 
major supplier of raw materials of strategic importance, and it also has a high level of 
technological expertise.  
Brazil has positioned itself as another pole of power in the international economic 
and political system while continuing to guard carefully its sovereignty, as in the case of 
self-imposed carbon monoxide (CO)-emission reduction targets. The Brazilian 
government has recognized that economic development is possible in a more 
environmentally friendly way than in Europe since the industrial revolution. But this 
objective can only be achieved through closer cooperation with the EU. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Gases that trap heat in the atmosphere are known as greenhouse gases. Although 
these gases are released in the course of natural activity on the planet, human activity is 
responsible for the sharp and dire increase of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in 
recent decades.4 Brazil is, with Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela, one of the biggest 
producers of greenhouse gas emissions in Latin America, although the government is 
pursuing an active role in climate politics.5 
4Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (BMU) [Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety], Internationale Klimapolitik 
[International Climate Policy], accessed November 21, 2013, www.bmu.de/P201/. 
5Augusto de la Torre, Pablo Fajnzylber, and John Nash, “Low Carbon, High Growth: Latin American 
Responses to Climate Change,” World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies (Washington, DC: The 
World Bank, 2009), 26‒27. 
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Table 1 shows the data of total greenhouse gas emissions for selected Latin 
American countries in 2010.6 
 
 
Country Greenhouse Gas Emissions 





Table 1.   Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Selected Latin American Countries. 
Brazil has been trying to mitigate climate change effectively while guaranteeing 
of the welfare of its citizens. With this dual aim, the country has been searching for 
solutions in conjunction with numerous actions that are both directly and indirectly 
favorable to the climate change. Brazil is committed to do more, taking full advantage of 
its national capacity under the auspices of a global effort to combat climate change. An 
adequate flow of financing, technology transfer, and capacity building resulting from 
international cooperation will be important elements to help meet the objectives 
stipulated in the National Plan on Climate Change.7 
From the different country reports of the United Nations, the World Bank, and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it becomes clear 
that in many countries, economic growth is closely linked to an enormous increase in 
emissions. Brazil’s efforts are based on the commitment to reduce social inequality and to 
increase income by seeking an economic dynamic with a low emissions trajectory, not 





7Government of Brasil, Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, Decree No. 6263 of 21 
November 2007, National Plan on Climate Change (Brasilia, 2008). 
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repeating the pattern of the countries that have already industrialized. For the 
development of the country to take place on a sustainable basis, government actions for 
the productive sector aim at a more efficient use of natural, scientific, technological, and 
human resources. In stimulating better performance, Brazil seeks to reduce the carbon 
content of Brazilian gross domestic product (GDP), improve the competitiveness of 
Brazilian products in the international market, increase income and generate economic 
surplus that can lead to better levels of social welfare. 
In relation to the EU, central topics of the Strategic Partnership with Brazil 
include effective multilateralism, cooperation on human rights, climate change, 
sustainable energy, the fight against poverty, MERCOSUR’s8 integration process and 
Latin America’s stability and prosperity. Trade is another important subject of dialogue 
because Brazil is the most important market for the EU in Latin America.9 Specifically, 
the EU seeks to ensure environmental sustainability, while at the same time supporting 
Brazil’s efforts to comply with its commitments under multilateral environmental 
agreements, in particular the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, and the Kyoto Protocol. 
Greenhouse gas reduction measures seem to have the potential to interfere with or 
even subvert the objectives of economic development and reduction of poverty. The 
related problem for the Brazilian government will be to identify suitable measures 
supporting economic and social development as well as stopping or at least reducing the 
increase of greenhouse gas emissions. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
For the last ten years, the challenges of how to respond to climate change and 
ensure sustainable development have been high on the political agenda among the 
world’s leading nations. The Clean Development Mechanism is part of the global carbon 
market developing rapidly as part of the Kyoto response to global warming. One of the 
8MERCOSUR is an economic and political agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela; “Quienes Somos,” MERCOSUR, accessed April 21, 2014, 
http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3862&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=3.  
9Europäische Kommission, Brasilien: Länderstrategiepapier 2007‒2013. 
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aims of the CDM is to achieve sustainable development in developing countries, but 
uncertainty prevails as to whether the CDM is doing what it promises to do. Nearly 200 
studies on the CDM have been carried out since its birth in 1997, including peer-
reviewed articles and reports from secondary sources. Overwhelmingly, these studies 
show that left to market forces, the CDM does not significantly contribute to sustainable 
development. In addition, the CDM projects do not have great influence on the goals of 
the EU’s Strategic Partnership agreements.10 
Research findings on how the CDM contributes to sustainable development have 
shifted in the last few years. For one thing, the studies have primarily been performed on 
a project-by-project basis. In a paper for the conference “Climate or Development?” held 
at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics in Germany, on October 28–29, 
2005, Christoph Sutter and Juan Carlos Parreño analyzed the portfolio of registered CDM 
projects approved by August 30, 2005.11 Since 2005, the literature has focused on the 
contribution of the CDM to sustainable development at aggregated levels, i.e., for all 
CDM projects in the portfolio rather than at the project level.12 A common perspective of 
the studies is the argument for the need for an international standard for sustainability 
assessment to counter weaknesses in the existing institutional structure. According to the 
World Bank’s program “Partnership for Market Readiness,” the first Brazilian CDM 
project was approved in 2004; CDM project activities in Brazil, up to June 30, 2011, 
show 499 projects approved nationwide. Brazil thus ranks fourth in the world for CDM 
projects, right after India, Indonesia, and China.13 
10Ever since the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the framework of 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EU is keen to speak in foreign policy with one voice. This goal is 
pursued with the help of so-called strategic partnerships with third countries and international 
organizations. Concluded strategic partnerships aim to strengthen cooperation in political and economic 
issues. The EU uses strategic partnerships to bundle and coordinate individual projects and contracts with 
structurally important third countries or international organizations. 
11Christoph Sutter and Juan Carlos Parreño, “Does the Current Clean Development Mechanism 
Deliver Its Sustainable Development Claim? Climate or Development?” (Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of 
International Economics, 2005), 81. 
12Sutter and Parreño, “Does the Current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Deliver Its 
Sustainable Development Claim? An Analysis of Officially Registered CDM Projects,” Climatic Change 
84 (2007): 75–90. 
13The World Bank, Projects and Operations, CDM Project Count, accessed November 16, 2013, 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/search?lang=en&searchTerm=CDM. 
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The official documents of Brazil’s government under the presidencies of Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff are the major sources concerning the country’s 
objectives of climate change programs.14 Brazil was involved in the CDM negotiations 
from the beginning, and its proposal for the establishment of a Clean Development Fund 
was essential for CDM development. Brazil is proud of this crucial contribution and sees 
itself as a pioneer in the evolution of suitable projects and project methods.15 
Furthermore, the CDM-related documents of the Interministerial Commission on Climate 
Change (CIMGC) offer valuable insight into the Brazilian CDM processes. Especially, 
the CIMGC documents provide information about CDM project activities, detail the 
specific regulations governing the submission of CDM project activities in Brazil, 
facilitate an understanding of the process, and promote the development of CDM projects 
in the country.16 
The European Commission set a five-year deadline to accomplish specific 
objectives in the agreements with Brazil.17 Additional information is directly related to 
the results of the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on sustainable development.18 The 
relevant documents of the UN contribute to the consultation and the support of the 
interpretation of the CDM project outcomes.19 All primary sources of the Brazilian 
government and the UN reviewed here have a positive bias in regard to the CDM 
outcomes. Concerning the official documents of the EU, the basic principle of the 
Strategic Partnership implies a positive attitude. It seems clear that such negotiations and 
agreements should only be conducted when all parties involved anticipate positive 
14Government of Brazil, Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, Decree No. 6263 of 
November 21, 2007, National Plan on Climate Change (Brasilia, 2008), 5‒7. 
15Lars Friberg, “Varieties of Carbon Governance: The Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil—A 
Success Story Challenged,” The Journal of Environment Development 18, no. 4 (2009): 395‒424. 
16Isaura Frondizi, Guide to the Clean Development Mechanism, trans. Knight Campbell (Rio de 
Janeiro: Imperial Novo Milênio, 2009), 12.  
17Europäische Kommission, Brasilien: Länderstrategiepapier 2007‒2013, 3. 
18United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 64/236--A/RES/64/236 Implementation of Agenda 
21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Outcomes of the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, New York: 2010. 
19United Nations, Economics of Climate Change in Latin America and the Caribbean Summary 2010, 
Santiago de Chile: 2010. 
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outcomes for their area of responsibility. A monitoring system to examine the outcomes 
is not part of the official documents. 
The CDM projects Plantar from Plantar S.A. and UTE-Barreiro from Vallourec & 
Mannesmann do Brasil (V&M do Brasil) have the required documentation for the 
authorization process carried out by the Brazilian government.20 Unsurprisingly, the 
official paperwork of the projects’ firms has a very positive attitude concerning the 
beneficial outcomes. This slant portrays the desired outcome from the companies’ point 
of view, because Plantar S.A. and V&M do Brasil want to support their projects and are 
looking for official subsidies and a return on investment. Fortunately, the official 
documentation offers a deeper look into the monitoring and validation process, so an 
almost objective comparison between the two projects appears possible.21 
From the review of the literature on how the CDM contributes to sustainable 
development, a consensus emerges that the CDM is beginning to do what a true market is 
meant to do. This development involves trade-offs between the two goals of the 
mechanism in favor of producing low-cost emission reductions at the expense of 
achieving SD benefits.22 One critique holds that “the CDM does not work,” in that it does 
not drive SD and does not fund renewable energy projects or carbon forestry projects 
20Federal Republic of Brazil, Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change, Plantar Letter 
of Approval (2007), accessed November 17, 2013, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/7/Z/9/7Z9KY7XL0W444I7UFGJM8WLI030D1B/LOA%20Brazil.pdf?t=c
VZ8bXdtZXNnfDCjamdLwEEi9GwXA_rd4S7e; Bureau Veritas Certification, Report No: BRAZIL-
val/BR1119369/2012 rev. 04.0, Validation Report V&M do Brasil S.A., Neuilly Sur Seine Cdx, France: 
2011, 9‒10. 
21Plantar Validation Report, “Validation Report: Mitigation of Methane Emissions in the Charcoal 
Productions of Plantar in Brazil. Report No. 2007–0196,” accessed November 25, 2013, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/EZG7AT3C7CHD70USTN3L11WK05JNQC; V&M 
validation report, “Validation Report: UTE Barreiro S.A. Renewable Electricity Generation Project – 
Brazil, Report No. 2005–0025,” accessed November 25, 2013, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/X/C/P/XCPVJLVEQ80TCV21RH9FD6E6844K0U/Validation%20Report.
pdf?t=bEJ8bXd1ajhrfDBrrhtLRBP28vcq_PyKFmYq. 
22K. Brown et al., “How Do CDM Projects Contribute to Sustainable Development?” Tyndall Centre 
Technical Report No. 16, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research: 2004, 1–53; A. Cosbey et 
al.,”Realizing the Development Dividend: Making the CDM Work for Developing Countries.” Phase 1 
Report – Prepublication Version, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD): 2005, 1–72; J. 
Ellis et al., “Taking Stock of Progress under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),” Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris: 2004, 1–51. 
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with high development co-benefits.23 However, the problem can be turned around. The 
CDM works perfectly to the extent that it produces the lowest-cost emission reductions. 
Left out of the market, however, are the SD benefits. While rhetorically mandated in the 
Kyoto Protocol, they are not monetized and therefore play a limited role in directing 
investments. 
Another part of the literature addresses the Strategic Partnership between the EU 
and Brazil in general terms24 as well as the related objectives.25 Describing the general 
tenor of these sources, scholars argue that the relationship of Brazil and the EU has not 
reached an equal level yet al.though Brazil shares many priorities with the EU and so can 
play a constructive role in bridging political differences, it follows a different power 
strategy.26 These varying positions suggest that strategic partnerships must be fine-tuned 
to fit the distinctive priorities and negotiating postures of different partners. Concerning 
the outcome of CDM projects, the focus of the scholarly analyses is on the interpretation 
of the effects on climate change potential and the achievement of ecological 
sustainability.27 Furthermore, several sources address the direct climate and economic 
effects within the Amazon basin in Brazil.28 From them, it appears that the CDM projects 
do not have positive effects. Most notably, the regional and local effects in regard to 
economic inequalities, the fight against poverty, and air pollution tend to be negative. 
23Ben Pearson, “The Clean Development Mechanism and Sustainable development,” Tiempo Climate 
Newswatch 2005, accessed November 17, 2013, 
http://www.tiempocyberclimate.org/newswatch/comment050301.htm. 
24Thomas Renard, “The EU Strategic Partnerships Review: Ten Guiding Principles,” ESPO, Policy 
Brief 2, FRIDE, Egmont: 2012; Susanne Gratius and Detlef Nolte, “Die EU und Lateinamerika: 
Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe?” [The EU and Latin America: Partnership at Eye Level?] German Institute 
of Global and Area Studies, GIGA Focus No. 2, Hamburg: 2013. 
25Giovanni Grevi, “The Rise of Strategic Partnerships: Between Interdependence and Power Politics,” 
ed. Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Chaillot Paper no. 109, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, Paris: 2008; Michael Emerson and Renato Flores, eds., “Enhancing the Brazil-EU 
Strategic Partnership – from the Bilateral to the Regional and Global,” CEPS, Brussels: 2010. 
26Gratius and González, “The EU and Brazil: Shared Goals, Different Strategies,” 11‒22. 
27 Sutter and Parreño, “Does the Current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Deliver Its 
Sustainable Development Claim? An Analysis of Officially Registered CDM projects,” Climatic Change 
84 (2007): 75–90. 
28“Inside a Champion - An Analysis of the Brazilian Development Model,” Publication Series on 
Democracy, ed. Dawid Danilo Bartelt (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2012). 
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The potential effects of the CDM projects concerning the economic sustainability 
objectives of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Brazil have not been 
examined so far. Many scholars agree that the two parties do not have a resilient common 
agenda on the issue of sustainable development at the global level.29 In addition, the 
Bertelsmann Foundation, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, and the 
Willis Harman House are offering interesting and valuable data concerning the 
sustainability issues of Brazil’s government performance.30 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The main approach of this thesis consists of a general evaluation of primary and 
secondary sources that deal with both the issue of climate change as well as the Strategic 
Partnership between the EU and Brazil. The initial literature research for the thesis was 
conducted in September and October 2013 using four sources. First, the American-based 
Web of Science gave 58 hits on peer-reviewed articles on the CDM in Brazil. Second, the 
Worldcat database showed 37 hits on the Strategic Partnership between the EU and 
Brazil. In this second part, the related journals had a bias towards European publications. 
Third, several journals and articles were found in the library databases of the Federal 
Armed Forces of Germany, the German Bundestag, and the European Union. Finally, 
additional sources on the subject of CDM were found through the Internet using 
Google/Google scholar. 
Concerning the European contribution, different institutions of the EU are 
involved in the Strategic Partnerships with external partners. In the case of the strategic 
agreements between the EU and Brazil, official papers from the European Commission 
and the European Parliament are important in this research. These documents address the 
agreements on the different objectives that are supposed to be achieved in this Strategic 
29Gratius and Nolte, “Die EU und Lateinamerika: Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe?” 
30Renato Flores et al. “Sustainable Governance in the BRICS - Country Report Brazil,” Sustainable 
Governance Indicators, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Bielefeld: 2011; “Brazil Case Study - Analysis of National 
Strategies for Sustainable Development,” International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
Ottawa: 2004. 
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Partnership.31 To evaluate the possible influence of environmental projects on economic 
objectives, two projects are considered in more detail. These projects were selected 
because of the availability of the accessible data sets. A comparison of the two projects is 
provided to demonstrate the impact expected on the economic objectives.  
In the literature research, the primary sources were initially considered to reach a 
formal assessment of the topic. These sources are limited to documents of the Brazilian 
government, the EU, and the government of Germany. The secondary sources include on 
the one hand extant titles mainly on the subject of climate change, and on the other hand, 
titles on the subject of the Strategic Partnership. The interpretation of the sources on the 
interaction of climate change and economic development in the example of Brazil and the 
EU represents the main part of this work. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The next chapter of the thesis after this introduction presents a general overview 
of the relationship of Brazil and the EU and the content of this Strategic Partnership and 
its declared goals.  
Chapter III of the thesis expands on the climatic objectives within the Strategic 
Partnership agreements. Therefore, the climatic goals appear in detail and the interactions 
with the fields of economy and development are examined. The objectives and effects of 
CO-emission trade regulations are not part of this thesis. Furthermore, Chapter III 
addresses the definition of sustainability, which is used in the Strategic Partnership. This 
part sheds light on which key points the definition entails. Furthermore, the thesis 
explains whether there are any indicators or factors with which the sustainability 
objectives are to be achieved.  
  
31Commission of the European Communities “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council—Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership,” COM (2007) 281 final, 
Brussels: 2007. 
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Chapter IV starts with a brief explanation of the CDM. The explanation is brief 
because it is not the main topic of the thesis. The “Plantar-Project” and the “UTE-
Barreiro-Project” are presented. All available data concerning the costs, the 
environmental effects, and the climate implications will be presented.  
The comparison of the effects of the CDM projects on the sustainability goals of 
the Strategic Partnership, as captured in Chapter V, forms the crux of this thesis. Of 
particular concern is whether the achievements of the project objectives are in line with 
the goals of the Strategic Partnership goals concerning climate change, the economy, and 
development. The German perspective on the Strategic Partnership and the future 
bilateral relationship with Brazil completes this part of the analysis. 
The thesis will close with an investigation of the definition of sustainability, 
which varies among countries and organizations. This divergence often spells problems 
when agreements are to be reached. Are there different interacting definitions—for 
example, objectives in the UN and the EU—that hamper agreement? And how can these 
problems be solved? 
  
 13 
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II. THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND BRAZIL 
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy32 (CFSP) was born in the 
reassuring post-Cold-War unipolar world, but it had to grow up in the much tougher 
strategic environment of the early twenty-first century, marked by asymmetric threats, 
power shifts, and economic turmoil. The EU was not prepared to cope with successive 
crises and, like other major actors, it has been struggling to adapt to a more competitive, 
diverse, and polycentric international context.33 To this end, the EU recognized that 
globalization not only offers new opportunities, but also reflects more complex and 
interconnected global threats. In the process of adapting new strategies for its foreign 
policy, the EU has implemented important adjustments, culminating in new levels of 
engagement and new scopes for cooperation with other major actors such as Brazil.  
The relations between the EU and Brazil date back to the Treaties of Rome in the 
1960s.34 In 1961, Brazil and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)35 
concluded a cooperation agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Brazil 
advanced the idea of a new economic and trade cooperation agreement at the end of 
1977, and exploratory talks began in 1979. They were concluded in July 1979, after the 
32The Common Foreign and Security Policy is the organized, agreed foreign policy of the European 
Union for mainly security and defense diplomacy and actions. CFSP deals only with a specific part of the 
EU’s external relations, which domains include mainly Trade and Commercial Policy and other areas such 
as funding to third countries, etc. Decisions require unanimity among member states in the Council of the 
European Union, but once agreed, certain aspects can be further decided by qualified majority voting. 
Foreign policy is chaired and represented by the EU’s High Representative. 
33Giovanni Grevi, “The EU and Brazil: Partnering in an Uncertain World?” CEPS working document 
No. 382, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, May 2013, 4. 
34Jasper Eitze, “Die EU und Brasilien – Partner für Klimaschutz und Energiesicherheit,” [The EU and 
Brazil - Partners for Climate Protection and Energy Security] Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung [Konrad-
Adenauer-Foundation], 2010, 1. 
35The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) is an international organization 
founded in 1958 with the purpose of creating a specialist market for nuclear power in Europe, developing 
nuclear energy and distributing it to its member states while selling the surplus to non-member states. It is 
legally distinct from the European Union, but has the same membership, and is governed by the EU’s 
institutions. 
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Brazilian government reaffirmed its interest in this agreement.36 After these new 
negotiations on trade cooperation, a first framework agreement on cooperation was 
signed in September 1980, though it was limited to cooperation in trade. With the end of 
military rule in 1985 and the consolidation of democracy in Brazil, bilateral relations took 
a leap forward. In June 1992, both parties signed an expanded framework agreement on 
cooperation. The major elements of this agreement included cooperation in the fields of 
trade, investment and finance, science and technology, transport, environment, social 
development, counter-narcotics, and regional integration. 
Ever since the introduction of the CFSP within the framework of the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993, the EU has striven to speak with one voice in foreign policy issues. 
Bilateral cooperation with third countries and international organizations advance this 
goal. More specifically, “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by 
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world.”37 Moreover, for further bilateral 
negotiations with Brazil, this approach creates a specified framework for the member 
states of the EU. In addition, when it comes to an intensification of the relations, the 
Brazilian government can be sure that all of the EU member states will keep to these 
defaults.  
A. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP—CONTENT AND DECLARED GOALS 
The term “Strategic Partnership” emerged in the implementation of the EU 
Security Strategy38 (ESS), which was adopted by the European Council in December 
36“The European Community and Brazil,” Europe Information—External Relations, Commission of 
the European Communities, X-218-80-EN, Brussels: 1980, 1. 
37Consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union, Article 21, Official Journal of the 
European Union C 115/13, May 9, 2008. 
38The European Security Strategy is the document in which the European Union clarifies its security 
strategy which is aimed at achieving a secure Europe in a better world, identifying the threats facing the 
Union, defining its strategic objectives and setting out the political implications for Europe. The European 
security strategy was for the first time drawn up in 2003 under the authority of the EU’s High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted by the Brussels 
European Council of 12 and 13 December in 2003. 
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2003.39 The only timely exception is the Strategic Partnership with the United States, 
which was already established in 1995. 
The ESS provides the conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. It is a brief but comprehensive document that analyzes and defines for 
the first time the EU’s security environment, identifying key security challenges and 
subsequent political implications for the EU. In this framework, the ESS singles out five 
key threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, 
state failure, and organized crime. Furthermore, the ESS calls for preventive engagement 
to avoid new conflicts/crises.40 The commitments made by the Strategic Partnerships are 
aimed at strengthening cooperation in political and economic issues. Thus, the EU uses 
the Strategic Partnerships to bundle and coordinate individual projects and contracts with 
important third countries or international organizations. 
Strategic Partnerships are implemented to fulfill three important roles. First, 
Strategic Partnerships enable the negotiating parties to position themselves essentially as 
equals. Second, structured bilateral relations provide, especially in the economic field, the 
opportunity for both parties to achieve benefits in international markets through mutual 
support.41 Unfortunately, the Strategic Partnership as such has not yet matched 
expectations on this account. For instance, trade agreements are held hostage to inter-
regional politics, and protectionism is on the rise.42 A traditionally asymmetric economic 
relationship has evolved into a more balanced one with sustained two-way investment 
39Margot Heimbach und Farina Busch, “Strategische Partnerschaften der Europäischen Union,” 
[Strategic Partnerships of the European Union] Deutscher Bundestag [German Bundestag], 
Wissenschaftliche Dienste [Science Services], Fachbereich WD 11 – Europa [Division WD 11 – Europe], 
Nr. 11/09 (July 29, 2009), 1. 
40“European Security Strategy,” European Union External Action Service, Brussels, accessed April 
20, 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/.  
41 Grevi, “The EU and Brazil: Partnering in an Uncertain World?” 9. 
42Jan D. Walter and Fernando Caulyt, “Brasilien dringt auf EU-Freihandelsabkommen,” [Brazil 
Pushes for an EU Free Trade Agreement] Deutsche Welle [German Wave], accessed February 14, 2014, 
http://dw.de/p/19UHy. 
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flows. Brazil became the fourth-largest investor in the EU, behind the United States, 
Switzerland, and Canada.43 
The third element describes the key function of the Strategic Partnership to 
implement consultations to address important issues on the international agenda, for 
instance, through a concerted action on the international scene. Although the overall 
progress has been marginal, some areas for renewed engagement have already been 
detected, for example, the mutual efforts in projects against climate change.44 
The EES directed the Union to become more active, capable, and coherent in 
addressing non-traditional threats and stressed the comprehensive and multilateral 
character of Europe’s international engagement.45 However, it did not accommodate the 
geo-strategic shifts that would soon challenge the economic and normative foundations of 
the international system itself. In pursuing its soft-power strategy, the EU sought to 
promote regional cooperation and integration in other parts of the world, for example, in 
establishing partnerships with the MERCOSUR and the African Union. 
The 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS, a rather formal document, 
deserves a mention here as evidence of the slowly evolving strategic outlook of the 
Union, and of creeping questions about the stability of the post-cold war order.46 The 
notion of a changing world is central to the very title of the report, which starts by 
acknowledging that globalization has brought with it opportunities, but also made threats 
more complex and interconnected, while “accelerating power shifts and … exposing 
43“Top ten countries as extra EU-27 partners for FDI positions, EU-27, end 2009‒2011,” Eurostat, 




44Christian Egenhofer and Monica Alessi, “EU Policy on Climate Change Mitigation since 
Copenhagen and the Economic Crisis,” CEPS Working Document No. 380, CEPS, Brussels, March 2013; 
Eduardo Viola, “Brazilian Climate Policy since 2005: Continuity, Change and Prospective,” CEPS 
Working Document No. 373, CEPS, Brussels, February 2013. 
45 Grevi, “The EU and Brazil: Partnering in an Uncertain World?” 2. 
46“Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Providing Security in a Changing 
World,” European Union External Action Service, Brussels, December 11, 2008. 
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differences in values.”47 The threat assessment was complemented by a new focus on 
climate and energy security in a world of scarce resources, as well as on cyber security. 
The notion of “partnerships for effective multilateralism” was introduced, referring to 
cooperation with both multilateral organizations and other important powers, including 
chiefly the United States but also Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Russia, and South 
Africa. The EU also has concluded a Strategic Partnership with NATO. Regarding the 
Strategic Partnership between the EU and Brazil in more detail, the mutual relation began 
in 1995 and is marked with a unique kind of dynamic. In December 1995, the Framework 
Agreement signed between the EU and MERCOSUR consolidated bilateral cooperation 
with Brazil. 
Despite the initial enthusiasm for cooperation on both sides, the bilateral relations 
have long been characterized as only of secondary importance and with occasionally 
conflicting interests. The mutual relationship has strengthened over the years. It must be 
noted that Brazil came into the European strategic view only in the course of its 
impressive economic boom in recent years and the associated increasing political 
presence of the country on the international stage.48 Although the rise of the country and 
its successful integration within the circle of regional leading powers were hard to ignore, 
the EU offered Brazil the status of a Strategic Partnership only in 2007, as the last of the 
BRIC countries.49 This arrangement is politically important for both the EU, whose 
international performance is often questioned, and for Brazil, which has long pursued its 
integration in the union of the world’s key players. 
47 Grevi, “The EU and Brazil: Partnering in an Uncertain World?” 3. 
48Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, “Die EU und Brasilien – Partner für Klimaschutz und 
Energiesicherheit,” [The EU and Brazil - Partners for Climate Protection and Energy Security] accessed 
February 13, 2014, http://www.kas.de/brasilien/de/publications/19835/; “Communication From The 
Commission To The European Parliament and The Council: Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership,” 
KOM (2007) 281, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 2007, 2. 
49Günther Maihold, “Strategische Partnerschaft und schwacher Interregionalismus: Die Beziehungen 
zwischen Brasilien und der EU,” [Strategic Partnership and Weak Interregionalism: The Relations between 
Brazil and the EU] in: Annegret Bendiek/Heinz Kramer (Hrsg.), Globale Außenpolitik der Europäischen 
Union. Interregionale Beziehungen und “strategische Partnerschaften [Global Foreign Policy of the 
European Union. Interregional Relations and “Strategic Partnerships”], Baden-Baden 2009. 
 19 
                                                 
In the first EU-Brazil summit, which was held in Lisbon on July 4, 2007, the two 
partners formalized the comprehensive strategic partnership and defined a number of 
priority areas for action, including: strengthening effective multilateralism, including a 
reform of the UN system and the promotion of human rights, and cooperation on global 
challenges. In addition to the political issues, several economic as well as practically 
oriented topics of mutual interest were discussed, for instance, economic and financial 
issues, information society, air and maritime transport, science and technology, satellite 
navigation, social affairs and regional development and integration.50 The last summit 
between the representatives of the EU and Brazil took place in January 2013. Official 
observers suggested that recession in Europe and the economic slowdown in Brazil have 
focused both parties on the opportunities that closer engagement might bring 
reinvigorated growth.51 
B. CLIMATIC OBJECTIVES IN THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
The area of environmental and climate protection has become the major focus of 
the common goals of the Strategic Partnership. Brazil’s environment is one of the richest 
in the world. Brazil’s natural wealth includes not only the dense tropical rainforests of the 
Amazon, but also the important biomes of the savannah-like Cerrado, the arid scrublands 
of the Caatinga, the Atlantic Forest, the grasslands of the Pampa and the wetlands of the 
Pantanal. Much of Brazil’s fauna and flora are found nowhere else on earth, its 
ecosystems contain more than 15 percent of the plant and animal species known to 
science. Brazil also holds 12 percent of the world’s available fresh water. According to 
the Ministry of the Environment, the value of environmental services rendered by 
Brazil’s ecosystems (in terms of mega-biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration) is several trillion euros per year. Therefore, Brazil has a key and strategic 
role to play on a global scale, a role that the country has assumed since it is party to a 
50Jesper Tvevad, “Lateinamerika.” [Latin America] European Parliament, 2012, 6‒7. 
51Elena Lazarou, “The Sixth EU-Brazil Summit: Business Beyond the Usual?” ESPO Policy Brief No. 
8, European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, FRIDE and the Egmont Institute, Madrid and Brussels, 
2013. 
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number of international conventions on environmental issues (biodiversity,52 climate 
change/Kyoto Protocol, desertification, endangered species, etc.) and participates actively 
in international conferences on the environment. Therefore, Brazil is a key partner in the 
EU’s campaign for a stronger commitment of the international community to the fight 
against climate change and further decline in biodiversity.53 
The fight against climate change and global warming is given a high priority 
within the EU. This position is also established in the first documents of the ESS, which 
were published in 2003.54 The significance of necessary measures against climate change 
has since gained significantly in importance.55 The climate objectives outlined in the 
documents are consistent with the climate goals of the United Nations, which were 
defined by the Framework Convention on Climate Change.56 Although the basic goals 
are consistent, concerning the implementation of individual goals, no common consensus 
was reached between the EU and the UNFCCC. This circumstance results primarily from 
the condition that the EU’s negotiating results must always be embodied in a 
multilaterally and contractual manner.57 Often, these conditions are only conditionally 
52Biodiversity is the degree of variation of life. This can refer to genetic variation, species variation, or 
ecosystem variation within an area, biome, or planet. Terrestrial biodiversity tends to be highest at low 
latitudes near the equator, which seems to be the result of the warm climate and high primary productivity. 
Marine biodiversity tends to be highest along coasts in the Western Pacific, where sea surface temperature 
is highest and in mid-latitudinal band in all oceans. Biodiversity generally tends to cluster in hotspots, and 
has been increasing through time but will be likely to slow in the future. Rapid environmental changes 
typically cause mass extinctions. 
53“Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament and The Council: Towards an 
EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership,” KOM (2007) 281, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 
2007, 8. 
 54“Ein sicheres Europa in einer besseren Welt—EUROPÄISCHE SICHERHEITSSTRATEGIE,” [A 
Secure Europe in a Better World—EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY] Rat der Europäischen Union 
[Council of the European Union], Brussels, 2003, accessed March 25, 2014, 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/031208ESSIIDE.pdf, 3. 
 55“Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy—Providing Security in a 
Changing World,” European Union External Action Service, Brussels, 2008, accessed March 25, 2014, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf, 5‒6. 
 56European Commission, “Ratification of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” COM(2013) 768 final, Brussels 2013, 
accessed March 25, 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/docs/com_2013_768_en.pdf, 2‒4. 
 57Thomas Renard and Giovanni Grevi, “Hot Issues, Cold Shoulders, Lukewarm Partners: EU 
Strategic Partnerships and Climate Change,” European Strategic Partnerships Observatory (ESPO), FRIDE 
2012, Madrid, 2012, 6. 
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acceptable for many negotiators of the EU. In addition, the Commission of the EU has to 
coordinate all measures of the different EU member states. This additional administrative 
level makes demanding situations even more complicated. Moreover, first approaches to 
climate policy cooperation between the EU and Brazil were already present before the 
conclusion of the Strategic Partnership, e.g., the 1992 pilot program PPG7.58 
Nevertheless, between both partners there are still different opinions about which 
programs and activities are most suitable to achieve the objectives of the fight against 
climate change. Nevertheless, the EU and Brazil are aware that a guarantee of sustainable 
prosperity and economic growth for both regions is inevitably associated with 
environmental protection and resource conservation. Subsequently, this shared belief 
holds for the continued close cooperation between the EU, its member states, and Brazil. 
As committed partners, the EU and Brazil are very active in several areas of 
environmental protection, especially in the conservation of the rain forests in the Amazon 
Basin, the management of water resources, the marine environment, global mercury 
pollution,59 and the unsustainable patterns of current consumption and production 
models. The EU has been leading the effort to reduce carbon emissions through 
technological innovations, taxation of energy products, and measures to curb energy 
demand. In addition, Brazil has passed national legislation including binding reduction 
targets, while discretely mediating between advanced and emerging or developing 
countries in the run-up to the Durban summit in December 2011.60 In addition, the 
58The PPG7 is a multilateral initiative of the Brazilian government, civil society and the international 
community aimed at developing innovative tools and methodologies for conserving Brazil’s rain forests. 
Program objective: to maximize the environmental benefits of rain forests through the implementation of 
pioneering projects that contribute to the ongoing reduction of the deforestation rate in Brazil. The Program 
was launched in 1992 with financial support from the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, 
France, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, and from the European Commission and 
the Brazilian Government, World Bank, accessed March 25, 2014, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20757004~pagePK:64257043~pi
PK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html.  
59Exposure to mercury, even in small amounts, is a great danger to humans and wildlife. When 
mercury enters the body it acts as a neurotoxin, which means it harms our brain and nervous system. 
Mercury exposure is especially dangerous to pregnant women and young children, but all adults are at risk 
for serious medical problems. Most mercury pollution is produced by coal-fired power plants and other 
industrial processes. Mercury also enters into the environment through the improper disposal (e.g., land 
filling, incineration) of certain products. 
60 Grevi, “The EU and Brazil: Partnering in an Uncertain World?” 10. 
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European Commission maintains a regular environmental and climate protection dialogue 
with Brazil. 
The documents of the Strategic Partnership show mainly that the EU and Brazil 
are committed partners in many areas of environmental protection, especially in the 
conservation of rain forests, the management of water resources, the marine environment, 
the global mercury challenge and unsustainable patterns of consumption and production 
models.61 Moreover, the EU and Brazil cooperate in international forums and establish 
bilateral consultations concerning environmental issues. In addition, the European 
Commission and Brazil maintain a regular environmental and climate protection 
dialogue. Within the documentation for the Strategic Partnership, the organization of 
collaboration is written in very general terms and the implementation of concrete 
measures is missing. The specific configuration and implementation of projects takes 
place primarily through additional bilateral arrangements between individual member 
states of the EU and Brazil. 
C. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
The achievement of fiscal and economic objectives is at least as highly rated as 
the realization of goals in the areas of environmental protection and resource 
conservation.62 For Europe, the importance of the Latin American region in general and 
of Brazil in particular is impressively confirmed by official EU data sets concerning the 
bilateral investments and economic involvement of European countries.63 Furthermore, 
Brazil is one of the major trading partners of the EU, and in addition to this, the EU is 
one of the largest donors of development funds. However, as already mentioned in the 
previous section on the climate protection targets, within the documents for the Strategic 
Partnership between Brazil and the EU no specific projects for implementation of 
 61“Communication From The Commission to The European Parliament and The Council: Towards an 
EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership,” KOM (2007) 281, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 
2007, 8. 
 62Renard and Grevi, “Hot Issues, Cold Shoulders, Lukewarm Partners: EU Strategic Partnerships and 
Climate Change,” 7. 
63“Trading with Mercosur,” European Commission, accessed March 25, 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/.  
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measures for sustainable development are mentioned in the economic field. Moreover, 
the formulation of general terms in the bilateral agreements between Brazil and the 
individual EU member states enables the partners to implement concrete measures with 
sufficient flexibility. Thus, the documents of the Strategic Partnership contain only 
interpretational statements concerning cooperation in the fields of information 
technology, civil aviation, maritime transport and maritime governance, science, 
technology, innovation and satellite navigation. In these areas, further incentives for 
mutual investment and economic cooperation should be created. In addition, the 
framework of the Strategic Partnership may serve as a dialogue for financial and 
macroeconomic issues.64 
Significantly, the aspect of dialogue and cooperation with MERCOSUR is a 
component of the Strategic Partnership. Negotiations with the union MERCOSUR started 
in 1995 have not achieved a conclusion. In January 2013, in Santiago, Chile, official 
representatives of the MERCOSUR and the EU held a Ministerial meeting on the further 
development of the relationship. In a joint communiqué, the official representatives 
highlighted the importance of the economic, trade and cultural relations between both 
regions, taking into account the combined population of more than 780 million people, a 
combined GDP of $20.8 trillion and bi-regional trade of around $130 billion per year.65 
Thus, as far as the economic relationship between the EU and Brazil is concerned, Brazil 
should be much more than a mere enabler for the negotiations with MERCOSUR.  
D. HOW TO MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF THE STRATEGIC 
PARTNERSHIP 
In order to implement the common goals of the Strategic Partnership effectively, 
sectoral policy dialogues are set up as needed. As mentioned earlier, the respective 
dialogues are present in the context of economic and financial policy. It was decided that 
64“Communication From The Commission to The European Parliament and The Council: Towards an 
EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership,” KOM (2007) 281, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 
2007, 13. 
 65“Joint Communiqué of the MERCOSUR-European Union Ministerial Meeting, Santiago/Chile 
2013,” European Union, Trade Policy, accessed March 25, 2014, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/january/tradoc_150458.pdf.  
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the EU-Brazil Joint Committee meet annually to discuss the progress of the bilateral 
cooperation.66 To underpin the Strategic Partnership, leaders adopted a second three-year 
(2012–2014) EU-Brazil Joint Action Plan at the summit in October 2011. The program’s 
aim to consolidate and further promote the partnership covers five main areas: peace and 
security through an effective multilateral system; economic, social, and environmental 
partnership to encourage sustainable development; regional cooperation; science, 
technology and innovation; and exchange between citizens. Furthermore, summits are 
held annually and focus on key global challenges. The summits focus on such topics as 
the maintenance of peace and security, climate change, developments in the international 
economy, as well as the analysis of the respective regional situations. The summits held 
so far (Rio de Janeiro, June 1999; Madrid, May 2002; Guadalajara, May 2004; Vienna, 
May 2006; and São Paulo, October 2008) have highlighted a number of converging 
political values between the EU and Brazil. The EU and Brazil share core values and 
interests, including a respect for the rule of law and human rights, concern about climate 
change, and the pursuit of economic growth and social justice at home and abroad. Brazil 
is a vital ally for the EU in addressing these and other challenges in international fora.67 
The Vienna Summit confirmed the two priority themes at the core of discussions: 
regional integration and social cohesion in Latin America. 
The European Court of Auditors (ECA) carried out an audit of the environmental 
aspects of development cooperation in Brazil.68 The audit’s findings highlight the 
relevance of the EU contribution to controlling deforestation and sustainable 
development of the Amazon rain forest. In addition, the ECA reports that the EU’s efforts 
take into account the global effects of the environmental degradation of the Brazilian 
biome and the links between the country’s poverty reduction and environmental 
management. Furthermore, the relation between good governance and law enforcement 
66“European Union-Brazil Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan,” Council of the European Union, 
15084/11, Brussels, October 4, 2011, 5. 
67“Brazil-Country Strategy Paper 2007‒2013,” European Commission, (E/2007/889), 2007, 13. 
68“SPECIAL REPORT No 6/2006 Concerning the Environmental Aspects of the Commission’s 
Development Cooperation, together with the Commission’s Replies,” Court of Auditors, Official Journal of 
the European Union C 235/1, Luxembourg, 2006. 
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and environmental management is also addressed by the EU’s commitments. The ECA 
notes that projects are riddled with implementation problems. Consequently, the 
respective solution for future projects is that only continuous support can secure success 
on the long-term sustainability of Brazil’s development subjects. 
E. IS SUSTAINABILITY MEASUREABLE? 
Considering the difficulties related to the monitoring of projects linked to the 
Strategic Partnership between the EU and Brazil, a major problem occurs: how to set a 
generally applicable definition of sustainability? According to the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED), “Arriving at a commonly accepted definition of 
sustainable development remains a challenge for all the actors in the development 
process.”69 The term “sustainability” is ubiquitous and is also linked with a variety of 
topics, for instance, environment, development, and economy. In 1987, the WCED tried 
to set a definition for sustainability in their final report, “Our Common Future.” 
Nevertheless, there is still no universal or generally accepted definition of the term. 
Despite the problems, which are linked to lack of a precise definition, there is a 
general consensus in the research literature that sustainable development includes the 
social, economic, and environmental dimensions.70 It is unrewarding to regard social 
affairs, economy, and ecology as independent systems; instead, these systems must be 
understood with their mutual interdependence and interactions. Therefore, the 
measurement of sustainable development is a vague concept that can be interpreted 
differently depending on the perspectives, value perceptions, and interests. Thus, within 
the scope of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Brazil, no consistent 
measurement of sustainability is possible and is therefore subject to mutually recognized 
perception. 
69“Our Common Future. The World Commission on Environment and Development,” WCED, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 45. 
70Bea Wittger, “Der Clean Development Mechanism in Brasilien – Nachhaltigkeitsstandards in 
Theorie und Praxis,” [The Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil - Sustainability Standards in Theory 
and Practice] Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie GmbH [Wuppertal Institute for 
Climate, Environment and Energy], 2010, 26. 
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F. WHAT ARE THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A STRATEGIC 
PARTNERSHIP? 
Considering the objectives and the problems linked to the implementation, the 
Strategic Partnership between the EU and Brazil has underperformed in many ways. 
Apart from cultural references, the perception of Europe’s engagement in Brazil is still 
strongly influenced by commercial interests. The aspects of the commitment to such 
common values as democracy and human rights are overtly less important.71 Not 
surprisingly, the EU has already concluded bilateral free trade agreements with Chile and 
Mexico. In contrast, relations with Brazil, by far its most important economic and 
political partner in Latin America, have been characterized as relatively underdeveloped 
and of mutual “benign neglect.”72 
The EU acknowledged Brazil’s role as an emerging economy and its increasing 
power in international forums, like the World Trade Organization (WTO). Indeed, the EU 
tried to benefit from Brazil’s leading role. Therefore, besides the critique that the 
Strategic Partnership is strongly focusing on trade issues, another crucial issue is related 
to the subject of global governance. Although, as mentioned previously, both partners set 
up a Joint Action Plan, their perceived centers of gravity are not completely congruent. 
Obviously, the EU seeks to create new regimes while preserving or adjusting the rules 
and composition of traditional multilateral frameworks in a cautious and incremental 
way. Brazil is less interested in new governance enterprises, but rather aims to transform 
the balance of power and some of the normative parameters underpinning existing 
institutions. 
Given the possible effects of tight budgets, there is a risk that the EU will start 
throwing generic strategies at problems as opposed to developing clear shared priorities 
71Susanne Gratius, “Brasilien und die EU: Wachsende Distanz trotz Wertegemeinschaft,” [Brazil and 
the EU: Growing Distance despite being a Community of Values] Die EU im Beziehungsgefüge großer 
Staaten: komplex – kooperativ – krisenhaft [The EU in the relational structure of large states: complex - 
cooperative - critical], ed. Kai-Olaf Lang and Gudrun Wacker (Berlin: SWP-Studie, Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit [SWP-Study, German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs], 2013), 17. 
72Alfredo Valladão, “Brazil: A ‘Strategic Partner’ for the EU?” An International Actor and Partner 
for the EU? ed. Susanne Gratius, IBSA: Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el 
Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), July 2008 (Working Paper 63), 17. 
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and pursuing them by anticipating events rather than reacting to them. For instance, the 
EU has adopted a “Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa” and a “Strategy for 
Security and Development in the Sahel,” both in 2011. In contrast to the realism on the 
EU side, Brazil, as an “anti-status quo power” and a leading power in the South, does not 
share the EU’s view of the world and therefore cannot be judged solely by “Western” 
standards.73 
G. WHAT IS THE WAY AHEAD? 
Despite some political differences, the EU and Brazil definitely share common 
values in seeking recognition, prestige, and influence. But so far, the parties have 
implemented different power strategies—the former anchored to the so-called Western 
camp; the latter, bent on countering challenges through soft balancing.74 In particular, a 
common history, shared respect for human rights and ethnic, religious, and cultural 
diversity, and a common vision of international relations based on the principles of 
multilateralism are generating an increasing demand for a meeting of minds and 
academic exchanges, driven by institutions on both sides. 
The international system is changing fast, and both the EU and Brazil must 
adapt.75 As the crises in Libya, Syria, Mali, and most recently Ukraine demonstrate, 
Europeans must take more responsibility to support stability around the Union and its 
vicinity, including military means as a last resort. For the EU, deepening interdependence 
requires enhanced engagement in various frameworks of international cooperation. As a 
relatively open power in economic terms and relying on energy provisions as well as 
other natural resources from abroad, the EU is critically dependent on the resilience of 
globalization. Closer engagement between the EU and Brazil would offer the opportunity 
to challenge binary narratives on the fledgling international order (old vs. new powers; 
73Wolf Grabendorff, “Brazil - A ‘Secure’ Partner for the European Union?” Noref Guest Writer 
Articles, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, October 2009, 1‒3. 
74Susanne Gratius, “Brazil and the EU: Between Balancing and Bandwagoning,” ESPO Working 
Paper No. 2, European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, FRIDE and the Egmont Institute, Madrid and 
Brussels, 2012. 
75 Grevi, “The EU and Brazil: Partnering in an Uncertain World?” 1. 
 28 
                                                 
North vs. South) and to make a difference together.76 In other words, as Albert Fishlow 
points out, “The EU, in the midst of its own difficulties, is seeking to retain a role.”77 
Basically, the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and the EU is as much 
interest-driven as directed by normative ideas. Because Brazil shares political and 
economic values with the EU, it is an important political partner for the country, 
especially, when it comes to resolving regional or international conflicts through 
negotiations or to claim the return to democracy. For the first time, this situation provides 
summitry an approach for a strategic alliance on the regional and international stage—an 
opportunity that must be seized in mutual interest. To achieve this goal, the dialogue on 
such controversial issues as trade and climate protection must be intensified significantly. 
According to the European Commission’s Strategy Country Paper, securing a 
sustainable environment for future generations is an important strategic objective for the 
Commission. Ensuring sustainable management of natural resources, combating 
deforestation and increasing the percentage of nationally protected areas are also amongst 
Brazil’s objectives.78 The impact of action on the environment can be maximized if an 
operational and systematic mechanism for consultation between stakeholders at various 




77Albert Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil since 1985, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press: 
2011), 191. 
78“Brazil - Country Strategy Paper 2007‒2013,” European Commission, (E/2007/889), 2007, 22.  
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III. THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM IN BRAZIL 
In its foreign policy, Brazil oscillates between the claim to represent the interests 
of the states of the southern hemisphere and emerging economies, on the one hand, and 
the desire, on the other hand, to be perceived as an equal participant in the forum of the 
industrialized countries. Brazil seeks greater influence in international politics, and it 
simultaneously defends the principles of non-intervention and self-determination.79 Thus, 
Brazil takes the principle of common, but differentiated, responsibility as the basis for the 
negotiations of the UN Conference on Environment and Development of 1992. 
Specifically, Brazil argues that developing and emerging countries have no obligation to 
reduce emissions because of the developed countries’ historical responsibility for climate 
change.80 Consequently, the obligation to finance climate-change measures in the 
southern hemisphere falls to the countries of the northern hemisphere.81 
Brazilian climate policy is informed by a domestic policy of market-oriented 
growth, which contributed to the rise of Brazil as an emerging country. Even today, 
however, the nation’s right to development entails some requisite pollution of the 
environment according to these principles.82 For this reason, Brazil initially rejected any 
international agreements or partnerships that would limit its sovereignty. However, 
within the Group of 77, plus China, the Brazilian government gradually revised this 
intransigent position, toward the EU and the United States.83 
79Claudia Zilla, “Brazil and Climate Policy: A Creative Partner with High Potential,” in International 
Climate Policy Priorities of Key Negotiating Parties, ed. Susanne Dröge (Berlin: German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs, 2010), 91. 
80 Friberg, “Varieties of Carbon Governance: The Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil—A 
Success Story Challenged,” 398. 
81David Michael Gößmann and Yesko Quiroga, Klima, Energie und Wachstum in Brasilien: Auf der 
Suche nach einem friedlichen Zusammenleben [Climate, Energy and Growth in Brazil: In Search of a 
Peaceful Coexistence] (Quito: FES, 2012), 5. 
82Alan Boyle, “Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment,” (London: Essex Court 
Chambers, 2010), 8. 
83Dieter Nohlen, Lexikon Dritte Welt: Länder, Organisationen, Theorien, Begriffe, Personen 
[Encyclopedia of the Third World Countries: Organizations, Theories, Concepts, Persons] (Hamburg: 
Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH [Rowohlt Paperback Publishers], 2002), 347. 
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At the end of 2009, in advance of the Copenhagen Climate Summit, Brazil 
pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for 2020. Based on an economic 
growth rate of 4 percent to 6 percent a year, emissions were projected to decline from 
38.9 percent to 36.1 percent.84 On the basis of its second report under the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Brazil predicted that its current GHG emissions would 
increase, without counter measures, by 2020 by about half, up to 3.2 gigatons.85 
Although, since the first global negotiations on climate change, there have been 
defined targets for reducing GHG emissions, numerous states have repeatedly refrained 
from implementing the agreed upon objectives in a national climate policy. These 
countries, to include Brazil, have always cited national constraints in explaining the 
delays in implementation. Brazil still has not adopted the objectives of the base year 1990 
that were defined by the Kyoto Protocol for industrialized countries.86 Furthermore, 
shortly after the Copenhagen agreement became national law and even amid the 
mounting effects of global climate change, Brazil’s objectives to reduce CO2 emissions 
were transformed to lower CO2 limits.87 Consequently, Brazil adapted its plans for the 
implementation of emissions reduction. The goal is to reduce total CO2 emissions by 38 
percent until 2020. Although these targets are a reduction compared with the expected 
yield in 2020, the total emissions for Brazil will increase accordingly in comparison to 
the current values. In addition, Brazil announced its intention to initiate cooperative 
efforts with other countries in Latin America and Africa in the fight against climate 
change.  
84Camila Moreno, “Green Economy and Development(alism) in Brazil – Resources, Climate and 
Energy Politics,” in Inside a Champion: An Analysis of the Brazilian Development Model, ed. Dawid 
Danilo Bartelt (Rio de Janeiro: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2012), 46. 
85Peter Sopher and Anthony Mansell, “Brazil—The World`s Carbon Market: A Case Study Guide to 
Emissions Trading,” Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and International Emissions Trading Association 
(IETA), (Washington, DC: 2013), 1. The current Brazilian objective is to avoid emissions growth over 2 
gigatons. 
86United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol base year data, accessed 
November 22, 2013, http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/kp_data_unfccc/base_year_data/items/4354.php. 
87David Michael Gößmann and Yesko Quiroga, Klima, Energie und Wachstum in Brasilien: Auf der 
Suche nach einem friedlichen Zusammenleben [Climate, Energy and Growth in Brazil: In Search of a 
Peaceful Coexistence] (Quito: FES, 2012), 5. 
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Moreover, this approach is consistent with the foreign policy orientation of Brazil 
and the intensification of the so-called South-South cooperation of the BRICS countries. 
This development not only illustrates the growing Brazilian awareness of the 
consequences of global climate change, but also reaffirms the country’s commitment to 
take regional and global responsibility. Thus, Brazil was able to strengthen its position in 
the international climate debate.88 But so far, no concrete projects have yet resulted from 
the announced cooperation on climate change.  
A. THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM  
The CDM is one of three flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol to reduce 
CO2 emissions. To facilitate the industrialized countries’ achievement of the objectives of 
the Kyoto Protocol, the agreement integrated three different flexible mechanisms: 
emissions trading,89 Joint Implementation (JI),90 and the Clean Development 
Mechanism.91 The detailed procedures for the CDM are itemized in Article 12, which 
enables governments or private corporations from developed countries to carry out 
emission reduction projects in developing countries. For those GHG emissions that have 
been reduced, the more developed countries receive Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs), which are credited to their respective national reduction targets.92 With CDMs, 
governments, companies, or so-called Carbon Funds invest in climate protection projects 
abroad, such as in plants for the production of renewable energy, in increasing energy 
efficiency, or in the neutralization of methane gases from waste management. As a result, 
they receive carbon credits in the amount of GHG emissions saved. The investors and 
project partners can use these carbon credits in the host country for billing their own 
88Claudia Zilla, “Brazil and Climate Policy: A Creative Partner with High Potential,” 91‒92. 
89A state, which exceeds its emission targets, can sell its ‘pollution quotas’ to other countries. 
90This mechanism differs from the CDM in that the project is not carried out in a developing country, 
but in an industrialized country. 
91United Nations, Kyoto-Protocol, 1998: articles 6, 12, and 17; Jørgen Fenhann and Miriam 
Hinostroza, “CDM Information and Guidebook,” UNEP Risø Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable 
Development (Roskilde: 2012), 11. 
92Karen Holm Olsen, “The Clean Development Mechanisms Contribution to Sustainable 
Development: A Review of the Literature,” Climate Change 84, no. 10 (2007): 60. 
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reduction commitments and sell the credits on the carbon market.93 Because of its good 
design and its high quality, the Brazilian CDM market enjoys a generally good 
reputation. As a consequence, Brazilian CERs are traded at a higher level, compared to 
Chinese or Indian CERs. 
The purpose of the CDM is to assist countries in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the ultimate objectives of the Convention. 
Additionally, the CDM serves to assist countries in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. In addition, the CDM seeks to achieve a stabilization of GHG concentrations in 
the atmosphere through projects that are intended (1) to explicitly contribute to the 
sustainability of the host country; and (2) to enable industrialized countries to adapt cost-
efficient emission reductions in developing countries.94 
B. NATIONAL PLAN ON CLIMATE CHANGE: THE CDM IN BRAZIL 
From the outset, Brazil has been strongly involved in the negotiations for the 
CDM, and its proposal for a Clean Development Fund was vital for the emergence of the 
CDM. The government of Brazil declares that effective measures to mitigate climate 
change in developing countries can only be achieved through technology transfer and 
financial incentives, useful for reducing the angular coefficient of the sigmoid curve of 
the GHG emissions during the economic development phases.95 
Brazil is proud of this significant contribution to the development of the CDM 
and sees itself as a pioneer in the development of suitable projects and project methods,96 
as well as establishment of the Brazilian Designated National Authority (DNA) and its 
national sustainability standards. 
93Elmar Altvater and Achim Brunnengräber, “Ablasshandel gegen Klimawandel? Marktbasierte 
Instrumente in der globalen Klimapolitik und ihre Alternativen,” [Selling of Indulgences Against Climate 
Change? Market-based Instruments in Global Climate Policy and its Alternatives] (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag 
[VSA Publishers], 2008), 13. 
94United Nations, Kyoto-Protocol, 1998: article 12.2. 
95GTZ, “CDM/JI Initiative Country Study—Brazil,” 33‒34. 
96 Friberg, “Varieties of Carbon Governance: The Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil—A 
Success Story Challenged,” 398. 
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In 2004, Brazil was the site of the world’s first CDM project registered by the UN 
Executive Board (EB).97 CDM projects have proliferated in Brazil ever since. Between 
2006 and 2008, the EB registered an increase of CDM projects in Brazil by 129 
percent.98 As of June 30, 2011, some 499 projects had been approved nationwide. (The 
majority of CDM projects are in the southeast and the southern parts of the country, 
particularly in the states of São Paulo (21 percent) and Minas Gerais (14 percent).)99 
Today, Brazil ranks fourth in the world for CDM projects, right after India, Indonesia, 
and China,100 and Brazil is one of the largest CDM host countries in the world. 
In the first commitment phase, from 2004 until 2008, the expected emission 
reductions from Brazilian CDM projects amount to 330,722,468 tons of CO2-equivalent 
(CO2e),101 i.e., 6 percent of the total global reductions.102 With an assumed value of 
$16.25 per unit, the potential gains from CDM projects in Brazil, therefore, are nearly 
$5.4 billion—$5,375,583,441, to be exact. This sum illustrates the economic relevance of 
CDM projects both for the Brazilian economy and for investors alike. Thus, for Brazil, 
the CDM could be quite a significant cash injection. 
  
97Responsible UN body for the international recognition of CDM projects. 
98GTZ, “CDM/JI Initiative Country Study—Brazil: A CDM Market Overview,” Eschborn: Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) [German Agency for Technical Cooperation] GmbH 
(2008), 12. 
99CIMGC, “Status atual das actividades de projeto no âmbito do Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento 
Limpo (MDL) no Brasil e no mundo,” [Current Status of Project Activities under the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) in Brazil and in the World] accessed November 24, 2013, 
http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0026/26987.pdf, 11. 
100The World Bank, Projects and Operations, CDM Project Count, accessed November 16, 2013, 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/search?lang=en&searchTerm=CDM. 
101Carbon dioxide equivalent (CDE) and equivalent carbon dioxide (CO2e) are two related but distinct 
measures for describing how much global warming a given type and amount of greenhouse gas may cause, 
using the functionally equivalent amount or concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) as the reference. 
102CIMGC, “Status atual das actividades de projeto no âmbito do Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento 
Limpo (MDL) no Brasil e no mundo,” accessed November 24, 2013, 
http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0026/26987.pdf, 4. 
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C. CDM PROJECTS IN BRAZIL 
With a share of 37 percent of all CDM projects in Latin America, Brazil is the 









Energy from biomass 43 26 
Hydro power 34 21 
Wind energy  4 2 
Dump gas production and usage 25 15 
Methane reduction in pig breeding  42 26 
Industrial gases (N2O, SF6, PFC)  6 4 
Fossil Fuel Switch  5 3 
Industrial Energy efficiency  2 1 
Miscellaneous 3 2 
TOTAL  164 100 
Table 2.   CDM Projects in Brazil. 
Since the introduction of CDM in Brazil, Project Design Documents (PDD) have 
been submitted for validation of a total of 447 projects.104 In relation to the 499 
registered CDM projects, 90 percent are located in the PDD phase. By far, the largest 
existing project is the N2O-emission reduction at the Adipic acid plant of the French 
company Rhodia in Paulínia, in the state of São Paulo, which was expected to save about 
103Germany Trade and Invest, “CDM Markt kompakt,” [CDM Market Compact] Cologne: 2009. 
104Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação [Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation], 




                                                 
5.9 million tons of CO2e per year by 2012.105 Furthermore, by August 2009, 211 projects 
reached the next administrative level and have been approved at the national level by the 
DNA.106 
The following comments are intended to provide a short overview of different 
climate protection measures, which are currently implemented in Brazil. According to 
scholarly opinion, these areas have great potential for further development. 
(1) Renewable Energies. More than 81 percent of all CDM projects developed 
in Brazil are renewable energy projects.107 Of these, however, the major part is 
concentrated in the area of energy from biomass, hydropower, and wind energy. Only 
about 6 percent of the renewable energy projects are classified as wind energy, and none 
are solar energy projects. Considering Brazil’s great natural potential for these two 
technology sectors, more CDM projects should be expected in the future.108 
(2) Biofuel Sector. An increase in the ethanol content in the biodiesel 
production is an alternative to be explored in the CDM framework. In this case, the CERs 
are generated from projects in which the percentage of biodiesel added to regular diesel 
exceeds the National Program for Biodiesel parameters (above 5 percent).109 
(3) Transport. In most of Brazil’s major cities, public transportation is 
inefficient. Projects with more efficient systems, like rapid bus transit, are eligible for the 
CDM market, working as an incentive for investments in this sector. For this activity, 
105United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “N2O Emission Reduction in nitric 
acid plant Paulínia, SP, Brazil,” accessed November 30, 2013, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-
CUK1174479298.53/. 
106CDM Project Activities, Designated National Authority (Interministerial Commission on Global 
Climate Change), accessed December 1, 2013, www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/4016.html. 
107Luiz Carlos Jacob Perera, Roberto Borges Kerr, Herbert Kimura and Fabiano Guasti Lima, 
“Investing in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Projects in Brazil,” Journal of Operations and 
Supply Chain Management 3, no.1 (2010): 4–8. 
108GTZ, “CDM/JI Initiative Country Study—Brazil,” 31. 
109John Wilkinson and Selena Herrera, “Biofuels, Climate Change and Sustainability in Brazil,” 
BRAZIL Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación para la Agricultura, 2010, 5‒15. 
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there is already a methodology approved for both the baseline and the monitoring by the 
CDM Executive Board.110 
(4) Solid Waste Sector. In the case of methane avoidance projects, the 
majority of the big Brazilian landfills are already operating within the CDM framework. 
Nevertheless, due to a consistent lack of solid waste management infrastructure, 
especially in medium and small cities, there is still a vast market potential for these types 
of projects. In this case, the generation of CERs could be an important incentive for the 
construction of new landfills. The German bank for reconstruction (Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau—KfW) announced in July 2009 its purchase of certificates for 2.4 million 
tons of CO from the Novo Gramacho landfill operator in the state of Rio de Janeiro up to 
the year 2012.111 By 2015, the savings in CO could be up to 6.4 million tons of CO2e. 
(5) Pyrolysis. Pyrolysis112 is the heating of an organic material, such as 
biomass, in the absence of oxygen. Because no oxygen is present the material does not 
combust but the chemical compounds (i.e., cellulose, hemicellulose, and lignin) that 
make up that material thermally decompose into combustible gases and charcoal. Most of 
these combustible gases can be condensed into a combustible liquid, called pyrolysis oil 
(bio-oil), though there are some permanent gases (CO2, CO, H2, light hydrocarbons). 
Thus, pyrolysis of biomass produces three products: one liquid, bio-oil; one solid, bio-
char; and one gaseous (syngas). The pyrolysis can be used for waste treatment in 
association with the landfills sites. In this case, the biogas from the disposal area would 
be burned in the furnace of pyrolysis reactors. The pyrolysis process can reduce 
significantly the volume of the waste and up to 90 percent of its weight. The sub-product 
110United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “The Buses of Brazil: Connectivity - 
Intelligent Transport Solution,” accessed December 1, 2013, 
http://unfccc.int/secretariat/momentum_for_change/items/6639.php. 
111Dow Jones TradeNews Emissions, “KfW kauft bis zu 2,4 Mio CERs aus Brasilien an,” [KfW Buys 
up to 2.4 million CERs from Brazil] accessed December 1, 2013, 
http://klimabonus.com/article160_12066.html. 
112“What Is Pyrolysis?” United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, 
accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.ars.usda.gov/Main/docs.htm?docid=19898. 
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of this treatment is rich in carbon and can be used in the industry as a solid fuel for 
boilers and furnaces. Pilot projects are already initiated.113 
(6) Wastewater Treatment Plants. The biogas generated in an anaerobic 
wastewater treatment plant is normally flared. By improving the technology to capture 
the biogas, making the flaring more efficient, these projects could be developed as CDM 
projects.114 The generation of energy and thermal power using this gas is also an 
alternative for obtaining CERs. In the case of small plants with a low methane emission 
level, the plants could be grouped in a Programmatic Approach (PoA), i.e., the bundling 
of many small actions. Depending on the treatment process there is no obligation for 
biogas capture (i.e., Anaerobic Lagoons). 
(7) Energy Efficiency. A so-far untapped aspect of the Brazilian market is 
energy efficiency in the industrial sector.115 Industrial enterprises are responsible not 
only for 44 percent of total energy consumption in Brazil, but also for the highest waste 
of energy. The Brazilian state energy-holding ELETROBRÁS believes that there is a 
huge energy savings potential mainly in electromechanical drives, responsible for more 
than 50 percent of the energy consumption in the country’s industrial sector.116 
For instance, ArcelorMittal Tubarão launched the first major project for its 
steelworks in Espirito Santo, north of Vitória. Through the use of blast furnace gas to 
generate electricity, ArcelorMittal plans to save a total of 900,000 tons CO2e. In addition, 
ArcelorMittal uses further savings in production and transportation for CDM projects. 
The potential of Energy Efficiency measures could be fully made available under the 
CDM by the Programmatic Approach.  
 
113GTZ, “CDM/JI Initiative Country Study—Brazil,” 32. 
114Mark Lazarowicz, Global Carbon Trading: A Framework for Reducing Emissions, (Norwich: TSO 
2010), 127‒130. 
115GTZ, “CDM/JI Initiative Country Study—Brazil,” 32. 
116Christophe de Gouvello, “Brazil Low-carbon Country Case Study,” (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, 2010), 55‒64. 
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(8) LULUCF. Land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) loom 
particularly large in the country`s emissions profile (77 percent).117 LULUCF projects 
are only beginning to enter the mainstream on the international market, and temporary 
CERs are still cheap, but the development of such projects is neither cheap nor quick to 
design and implement. Therefore, at least for the first commitment period, LULUCF 
projects are not expected to play a significant role in the Brazilian CDM market. On the 
other hand, on the voluntary market, they play a quite important role, especially in 
connection with compensation of company emissions and corporate social responsibility 
measures. For several reasons, forestry measures play only a subordinate role in the CDM 
context, both in Brazil and internationally. 
PoAs offer an interesting way to support the insertion of new technologies in 
specific industrial sectors (i.e., solar power), where an initial set of facilities would be 
committed in the registration and further units could be incorporated into the PoA at a 
later stage. Currently, two Brazilian PoAs of the food producer Sadia await registration 
by the EB for methane avoidance projects in pig farming. 
Currently, forestry projects in Brazil are carried out especially for the voluntary 
market.118 Landfill sites are considered to be another interesting field, not least due to 
numerous waste scandals and the problems of waste disposal. The landfill site projects 
reduce methane emissions from Brazil’s largest garbage dumps and ranks among the top 
five in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in this category. Now, all 
major landfill sites in the country are used for the CDM. 
 
117Anke Herold, “Berücksichtigung von Treibhausgasemissionen und –festlegungen durch 
Landnutzungsmaßnahmen (LULUCF) im Post-Kyoto-Regime – Quantitative Analyse zur Einbeziehung 
von reduzierter Entwaldung in ein künftiges Klimaregime,” [Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Repairs by Land Use Activities (LULUCF) in the post-Kyoto Regime - Quantitative Analysis for the 
Inclusion of Reduced Deforestation in a Future Climate Regime] (Berlin: Öko-Institut [Institute for Applied 
Ecology], 2008), 39. 
118In contrast to the strict rules set out for the mandatory market, the voluntary market provides 
companies with different options to acquire emissions reductions. 
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D. CRITICISMS OF BRAZILIAN CDMS 
The main focus of the critiques that can be found in the literature is on the 
financial aspect of the CDM projects and not on an assessment of specific CDM 
measures. Concerning the administrative process, it is the sovereign responsibility of 
each developing country to ensure that a CDM project promotes sustainable 
development.119 The various host countries hold different views on what characterizes 
sustainable development within a CDM process.120 For developing countries, 
sustainability is closely linked to the economic development opportunities. Thus, it seems 
likely that countries implement CDM projects only for possible financial benefits.  
From individual projects in Brazil, even with a larger investment perspective, 
only a small part of the population is able to benefit.121 The CDM projects are 
geographically very unevenly distributed. Thus, the benefits of the project-based 
approaches are limited and the impacts of the CDM measures are concentrated only at the 
local level. For example, through the implementation of CDM measures only the local 
population gets access to clean natural resources and the biodiversity can be protected 
only in the territory that surrounds the project. These restrictions also apply to the labor 
market; new jobs will be created only in the immediate vicinity of the project. 
Another aspect of the Brazilian CDM efforts is related to the effects of technology 
transfer that remain initially limited because of the project-specific approach and the only 
gradual spread of information. According to the regulations of the Kyoto Protocol, it 
speaks for the efficiency of the mechanism that the largest share of funds is flowing into 
the states where the greatest reduction potential lies. At the same time, however, it was 
decided at the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali in 2007 that the fees for CDM 
projects in the least developed countries would be eliminated in order to promote the 
119 Friberg, “Varieties of Carbon Governance: The Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil—A 
Success Story Challenged,” 405‒407. 
120Susanne Dröge, “The International Climate Policy Negotiations: Objectives, Themes, and 
Prospects for Success,” in International Climate Policy Priorities of Key Negotiating Parties, ed. Susanne 
Dröge (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2010), 25‒27. 
121Dietmar Mirkes, “Ökologischer Fußabtritt statt nachhaltiger Entwicklung,” [Ecological Footprint 
Instead of Sustainable Development] in CDM-Brennpunkt [CDM focal point ] (2011), 13. 
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implementation of projects in these countries.122 However, the CDM only selectively 
improves the business environment for climate change investments. Consequently, other 
instruments of international climate policy, such as UN and national funds as well as 
development aid are better suited for building the necessary financial framework. In the 
short term, it is likely that greater contributions to climate protection can be provided. In 
addition, the developing countries still need resources to support their adaptations to 
climate change. 
Even very effective CDM projects cannot negate their fundamental flaw: as good 
as it is that GHG, especially the strong ones, are no longer released into the atmosphere, 
we must not forget that the exact same amount of GHG emissions will be released into 
the air somewhere else. Good things in the southern hemisphere neutralize bad things in 
the northern hemisphere. Both environmentally and morally, the whole CDM mechanism 
appears to be an ultimately zero sum game, which allows “business-as-usual” to 
continue.123 
E. CONCLUSION 
About ten years after adopting the implemention rules under the UNFCCC 
conference of Marrakesh, the CDM proved in an impressive way to dynamically extend a 
market-based approach to the global level.124 Over the years, the CDM developed a 
comprehensive compendium of methods and initiated significant learning processes at the 
project stage, as well as at the national and international level. In addition, the global 
awareness on climate change is a great accomplishment of the project-based mechanisms. 
The experiences with the CDM also revealed several weaknesses of the general 
approach that required a continuing readjustment. In this way, the introduction of 
122United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Decisions of the Bali Climate 
Change Conference - December 2007,” accessed April 20, 2014, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/bali_dec_2007/meeting/6319/php/view/decisions.php. 
123Mirkes, “Ökologischer Fußabtritt statt nachhaltiger Entwicklung,” 11. 
124Nicolas Kreibich and Heiko Fechtner, “Potentiale ausgeschöpft und Hürden überwunden? CDM 
und JI in der ersten Kyoto-Verpflichtungsperiode,” [Potentials Exploited and Obstacles Overcome? CDM 
and JI in the First Kyoto Commitment Period] Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie GmbH, May 
2013, 30. 
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programmatic CDM achieved significant improvements in the geographical and sectorial 
distribution, and also in proving the additionality of projects, as significant progress has 
been made. In addition, the CDM Executive Board succeeded in optimizing its processes 
and procedures, which led to a significant reduction of delays in project registration.125 
While the individual project-like interventions have so far been unable to initiate 
adequate changes in each sector that would be necessary for a fundamental 
transformation of the economic structure of the host country, now the expansion through 
the programmatic CDM enables the potential for broader changes in the host countries. 
It remains to be seen whether the increasing number of newly created PoAs are 
suitable to initiate sectoral changes. A systematic expansion of the CDM towards a 
sectoral mechanism, as well as a greater integration of CDM activities in the medium- 
and long-term strategies of the host countries could help to strengthen the performance of 
the CDM in this field even further. However, other weaknesses of the CDM have not 
been successfully solved so far, especially to ensure high contributions of projects for 
sustainable development of the host countries.126 The individual project types have large 
differences in their sustainability impacts, due to the lack of an international standard for 
assessing sustainability contributions. 
However, the development of the project mechanisms should be continued. The 
importance of these mechanisms for the nascent market mechanisms and the 2015 global 
climate agreement is not to be underestimated. Together with the experience of the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, major foundations for the further development 
of the international climate regime can hereby be created. 
F. THE BRAZILIAN DEFINITION OF SUSTAINABILITY 
As described in the previous section, from the outset, Brazil has been strongly 
involved in the negotiations for the CDM, and its proposal for a Clean Development 
125CDM Policy Dialogue, Climate Change, Carbon Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action - Report 
of the High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue (2012), accessed February 16, 2014, 
http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/report/rpt110912.pdf, 52‒55. 
126 Kreibich and Fechtner, “Potentiale ausgeschöpft und Hürden überwunden? CDM und JI in der 
ersten Kyoto-Verpflichtungsperiode,,” 31. 
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Fund was vital for the emergence of the CDM. Brazil is proud of this significant 
contribution to the development of the CDM and sees itself as a pioneer in the 
development of suitable projects and project methods.127 
1. The Designated National Authority 
By Presidential Decree of July 7, 1999, the former Brazilian President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso initiated the foundation of the Interministerial Commission on Climate 
Change (Comissão Interministerial de Mudança Global do Clima—CIMGC), the 
respective Brazilian DNA.128 The official governmental decree came into force in July 
1999. Thereby, Brazil was the first country worldwide that established such a 
commission.129 The CIMGC meets every two months and consists of representatives 
from eleven ministries.130 The Ministry of Science and Technology is the chair of the 
CIMGC and acts as Executive Secretariat, while the Ministry of Environment takes over 
as Deputy Chairman.131 The Brazilian DNA is an inter-ministerial model of an approval 
authority.132 Consequently, all relevant ministries are integrated on a permanent basis, 
which guarantees a large bandwidth of expertise. However, this model is criticized 
127 Friberg, “Varieties of Carbon Governance: The Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil—A 
Success Story Challenged,” 395‒424. 
128“Designated National Authority (Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change),” 
Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, accessed April 20, 2014, 
http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/14666.html.  
129“Portataria Nº 533, de 29 de agosto de 2000,” [Law No. 533 of August 29, 2000] Regimento 
Interno Comissão Interministerial de Mudança global do Clima [Internal Regiment Interministerial 
Commission on Global Climate Change], accessed March 2, 2014, 
http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0001/1545.pdf, article 3. 
130It entails the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transport, the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Ministry of Budget Planning and Administration, the Ministry of 
Environment, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade, the Office of the President, and the Ministry of city management; Lars Friberg, “Varieties of Carbon 
Governance: The Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil—A Success Story Challenged,” 395‒424. 
131“Portataria Nº 533, de 29 de agosto de 2000,” Regimento Interno Comissão Interministerial de 
Mudança global do Clima, accessed March 2, 2014, http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0001/1545.pdf, §1 
and §3. 
132There are additional models for the institutionalization of the DNAs: the single government model, 
the two-unit model, the FDI-piggyback model, and the outsourcing model. Axel Michaelowa and Daisuke 
Hayashi, “Efficient DNA Operation: Lessons from Different DNA Settings in non-Annex-B Countries,” 
HWWI Research Paper 4–10, Hamburg (2007): Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInstitut [Hamburg Institute 
of International Economics], 5. 
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because all ministries need to be involved in the decisions making process. Consequently, 
this bears a great potential to trigger conflicts of interest and to cause disproportionately 
high costs.133 
The tasks of the CIMGC include, among other things, the support and advice of 
the Brazilian government in international climate negotiations, evaluation and approval 
of CDM projects, the verification of compliance with the legislation during the CDM 
process, communication of decisions to the outside setting, and the development and 
examination of the sustainability criteria for CDM projects.134 
Generally, the Brazilian DNA has the prerogative to determine the sustainability 
criteria for all national CDM projects. It is subject to no international orders or 
specifications. As discussed in the previous section, there is no generally accepted 
definition of the term sustainability to which the national institutions may be able to 
relate in their decisions making process. It is therefore essential that the Brazilian DNA 
clearly defines its understanding of a sustainable development. That appears to be the 
only possibility in which appropriate inputs for the development of verifiable indicators 
can be implemented. 
2. Center for Integrated Environmental and Climate Studies 
In 2000, the CIMGC commissioned the Center for Integrated Environmental and 
Climate Studies (Centro de Estudos sobre Meio Ambiente e Integrados Mudanças 
Climáticas—Centro Clima) with the development of sustainability criteria for CDM 
projects. Subsequently, these criteria should have been submitted to the CIMGC to serve 
as a basic document for discussion and guidance in terms of the final evaluation of the 
Brazilian CDM criteria. The established standards by the Center for Integrated 
Environmental and Climate Studies are based on the study Criteria and Indicators for 
133Michaelowa and Hayashi, “Efficient DNA Operation: Lessons from different DNA settings in non-
Annex-B Countries,” 6. 
134“Portataria Nº 533, de 29 de agosto de 2000,” Regimento Interno Comissão Interministerial de 
Mudança global do Clima, accessed March 2, 2014, http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0001/1545.pdf, 
article 3. 
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Appraising Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Projects by Dr. Emilio Lèbre La 
Rovere and Steve Thorne.135 
Compared to the original proposal of standards, the CIMGC ultimately made a 
decision for sustainability criteria in a much-reduced scope that entails a framework of 
guidelines. Instead of a concrete assessment based on a defined point scale, which is 
carried out by the DNA itself, currently the project developers have to describe their 
project using the following five criteria.136 
1. Contribution to local, ecological sustainability: Therefore, the climate 
impact of the project has to be evaluated in comparison to the estimated 
climate change mitigation effect of a reference scenario.137 
2. Contribution to the field of job creation and the development of social 
working conditions: The contribution of the project concerning civil 
rights, health and education programs, as well as social and workplace 
responsibility has to be evaluated. In addition, an evaluation of the direct 
and indirect improvements of the working conditions has to be conducted. 
Moreover, this evaluation has to be compared to the reference scenario. 
3. Contribution to income distribution: The direct and indirect socio-
economic effects on the quality of life of the population with low incomes 
have to be evaluated again in comparison to the reference scenario. 
4. Contribution to education and technological development: Here, the 
degree of technological innovation is compared to a reference scenario and 
entails the origin of the technology, the reproducibility, the existence of 
royalty, and the necessary support to sustain the development. 
 
 
135Centro Clima [Climate Center], “Proposta Revisada de critérios e indicadores de elegibilidade para 
avaliação de projetos candidatos ao Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento Limpo (MDL),” [Revised Proposal of 
Criteria and Indicators for Assessing the Eligibility of Potential Projects for the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)] Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Estudos Integrados sobre Meio Ambiente e Mudanças 
Climáticas [Center for Integrated Studies on Environment and Climate Change], accessed February 27, 
2014, http://www.centroclima.coppe.ufrj.br/index.html. 
136“Resolução N°1, de 11 de setembro de 2003,” [Resolution No. 1 of September 11, 2003] Comissão 
Interministerial de Mudança global do Clima, accessed March 2, 2014, 
http://carbono.brasilcooperativo.coop.br/sites/1400/1480/00000070.pdf, Appendix III. 
137The reference scenario is part of the methodology for CDM. The methodology includes 
afforestation and reforestation projects, requires development of a baseline which indicates what emissions 
would occur in the absence of the project: credits are issued on the basis of the difference between this 
‘business as usual’ scenario and the emissions or removals attributable to the project. The baseline 
represents the counterfactual case, and thus the target to be beaten. 
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5. Regional integration and the impact of the project on other sectors: The 
contribution to regional development can be evaluated by the integration 
of the project with a comparison to other socio-economic activities in the 
region. 
When the description of the sustainability benefits is perceived to be inadequate, 
the project developers will be given a period of 60 days to adapt the description. 
According to Branca Americano,  
There is no threshold for any of these five aspects or headings, nor any 
kind of indicator for any of them, nor any measure for all the aspects of 
sustainable development. The DNA takes into account the project itself 
based on the document (the so-called Appendix No. III), which explains 
the contribution to sustainable development and takes into consideration 
the whole picture. In many cases the CIMGC requests additional 
information and clarification about the contribution envisaged to some of 
the sustainable development aspects described by the project 
proponent.138 
The specified Brazilian sustainability criteria include all three dimensions of 
sustainable development.139 
1. Internalization of the profits from the CERs in the national economy, 
2. Possibility of regional integration and cross effects with other areas, 
3. Potential of technological innovation. 
Therefore, Brazil is following the international minimum consensus. Although if 
all three dimensions are taken into account, the social dimension is in contrast to the 
environmental and economic dimensions represented to a much lesser extent. This 
suggests that there is a bias of the DNA to act investor-friendly and, above all, to 
encourage economic development. 
138Branca Americano, “CDM in Brazil: Towards Structural Change for Sustainable Development in 
Some Sectors,” in A Reformed CDM–Including new Mechanisms for Sustainable Development, ed. Karen 
Holm Olsen and Jørgen Fenhann (Copenhagen: UNEP-Risø Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable 
Development CD4CDM, 2008), 23–35. 
139Centro Clima, “Proposta Revisada de critérios e indicadores de elegibilidade para avaliação de 
projetos candidatos ao Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento Limpo (MDL),” Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Estudos 
Integrados sobre Meio Ambiente e Mudanças Climáticas, accessed February 27, 2014, 
http://www.centroclima.coppe.ufrj.br/index.html. 
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With regard to the selection of the sustainability criteria, it can be stated that the 
Brazilian DNA did not make a good choice. Faced with a weak definition of 
sustainability and an insufficient operationalization, a highly subjective assessment of the 
sustainability benefits of CDM projects is very likely. 
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IV. TWO CDM PROJECTS 
This chapter tests Brazil’s sustainability standards in the concrete cases of two 
CDM projects. Specifically, it will examine whether the sustainability criteria match the 
practice. The CDM project of Plantar S.A. entails the mitigation of methane emissions in 
the production of charcoal; the CDM project of Vallourec & Mannesmann do Brazil 
(V&M do Brazil) is a renewable electricity generation project. Both projects focus on 
planting eucalyptus trees and their exploitation for the production of charcoal. In 
UNFCCC terms, these projects are so-called sink projects.140 Granted the similar 
characteristics of the two projects, their effects on climate and economy are closely 
linked. 
A. THE PLANTAR PROJECT 
The company Plantar S.A. was founded in 1967 and is currently owner of 
approximately 465,000 acres of land in the state of Minas Gerais. At the time of its 
founding, the Brazilian government offered tax incentives for eucalyptus plantations. The 
company was formed initially to take advantage of these tax benefits. In 1984, the 
industrial production of pig iron was integrated into the corporate group through the 
establishment of the subsidiary Plantar Siderúrgia. In 2001, the company had a turnover 
of $85 million;141 it is expected to post annual savings of 16,098t CO2e.142 The CDM 
140“Sink means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a 
precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.” UNFCCC, 1992: article 1, § 8. 
141Tobias Schmitt, “Saubere Entwicklung für den Süden? Der Clean Development Mechanism und 
seine regionalen Auswirkungen: Am Beispiel von Eukalyptusplantagen in Curvelo, Südost-Brasilien,” 
[Clean Development for the South? The Clean Development Mechanism and its Regional Implications: the 
Example of Eucalyptus Plantations in Curvelo, Southeast Brazil] in Wirtschafts- und sozialräumliche 
Strukturwandlungen und Interessenskonflikte in Lateinamerika [Economic and socio-spatial structure 
changes and conflicts of interest in Latin America], ed. G. Kohlhepp, 2005, 355. 
142UNFCCC, CDM – Executive Board Project Design Document Form for Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities (CDM-AR-PDD)—Version 04, accessed April 6, 2014, 
http://www.netinform.net/KE/files/pdf/PDD_AR_Plantar.pdf, 14. 
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project of Plantar S.A. is financed by the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund, which 
was launched in 2000.143 The project entails four project components. 
The first two components of the project involve 57,500 acres of the company`s 
eucalyptus plantation in the Cerrado region, located in the municipalities of Belo 
Horizonte, Curvelo, Felixlândia, and Morada Nova de Minas.144 This part of the project 
is an integrated approach for the production of pig iron with a simultaneous reduction of 
CO2. Concerning the first component of the project, the eucalyptus plantation not only 
stores CO2 from the atmosphere, but the wood from the eucalyptus trees is also used for 
the production of charcoal. The second component entails the use of this charcoal for the 
company`s production of industrial pig iron.  
The third component of the project relates to the reduction of the methane gas 
emissions from the charcoal production, which is achieved by a corresponding 
improvement in the production process. Automatic ignition devices are used to ensure the 
combustion of the gas in the coal stoves, which subsequently prevents the emergence of 
emissions.145  
The fourth component of the project refers to the restoration of 1000 acres of 
native Cerrado vegetation on former pastures and eucalyptus plantations.146 
  
143Peter H. May, Emily Boyd, Manyu Chang, and Fernando Veiga, “Local Sustainable Development 
Effects of Forest Carbon Projects in Brazil and Bolivia. A View from the Field,” Center for International 
Forestry Research, accessed March 1, 2014, http://www.cifor.org/publications/corporate/cd-roms/bonn-
proc/pdfs/papers/T6_FINAL_May.pdf, 21. 
144“Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-PDD) Version 03.1, 
UNFCCC,” accessed March 1, 2014, http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0022/22065.pdf, 4. 
145Ibid., 6. 
146“Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-PDD) Version 03.1, 
UNFCCC,” 1; Tobias Schmitt, “Saubere Entwicklung für den Süden? Der Clean Development Mechanism 
und seine regionalen Auswirkungen: Am Beispiel von Eukalyptusplantagen in Curvelo, Südost-Brasilien,” 
357. 
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The Executive Board approved and registered the project on August 9, 2007. 
Significantly, the responsible Designated Operational Entity,147 the Norwegian company 
Det Norske Veritas, was asked three times to revise and adopt the submitted documents 
to address two issues: first, the more accurate representation of project benefits and 
second, the rationale for further consideration of the CDM criteria.148 In March 2007, the 
CDM project of Plantar S.A. received the final Letter of Approval (LoA) from the 
CIMGC, and the project’s benefits for Brazil’s sustainable development were officially 
confirmed.149  
It has to be assumed that a previous examination of the PDD has satisfied the 
CIMGC. On the webpage of the CIMGC, Appendix III of Resolution No.1, in which the 
sustainability benefits of the project must be described in terms of the five criteria, is only 
available in the Portuguese language.150 Thus, access to the contents is only guaranteed 
for stakeholders who speak Portuguese. 
1. Appendix III 
Plantar S.A. claims, in Appendix III of the LoA, contributions to: 
• local ecological sustainability 
• job creation and development of social working conditions 
• income distribution 
• education and technological development  
• regional integration and the impact of the project on other sectors. 
147A designated operational entity is an independent auditor accredited by the CDM Executive Board 
(CDM EB) to validate project proposals or verify whether implemented projects have achieved planned 
greenhouse gas emission reductions; UNFCCC, accessed March 1, 2014, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/index.html. 
148“Project: 1051 Mitigation of Methane Emissions in the Charcoal Production of Plantar, Brazil – 
History,” Project Cycle Search, UNFCCC, accessed March 24, 2014, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1175235824.92/history.  
149“Federative Republic of Brazil—Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change, Letter of 
Approval,” March 23, 2007. 
150“Mitigação de Emissões de Metano na Produção de Carvão Vegetal da Plantar,” [Mitigation of 
Methane Emissions in the Charcoal Production of Plantar] Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, 
accessed March 17, 2014, http://mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/58160.html.  
 51 
                                                 
In regard to its contribution to local, ecological sustainability, the company 
compares its production method to conventional production. Plantar S.A. states that for 
conventional charcoal production, large parts of the original rain forest would have to be 
cut down. The production of charcoal would also be possible only under unhealthy 
conditions for the rural population. The furnaces used for such charcoal production are 
technically very simple and could thus release large amounts of methane gas. Compared 
to this reference scenario, the improved furnaces and the sophisticated production 
technology lead to a considerable reduction of the greenhouse gas methane.151 Moreover, 
for its charcoal production, Plantar S.A. uses only wood from its own eucalyptus 
plantations. Consequently, the company is able to rely on a “clean and sustainable energy 
source.”152 Furthermore, the CO2, which is released during the production, counts as 
“carbon neutral” because it is compensated by carbon storage in the eucalyptus 
plantations. 
In addition to these improvements, Plantar S.A. emphasizes that the topic of 
environmental awareness is anchored in the company’s policy. Moreover, the company 
explains that only scientifically proven methods and techniques to protect the 
environment will be implemented.153 In this context, the company notes the monitoring 
plan for its projects. This plan provides a strong monitoring process with specific 
indicators relating to fauna, flora, water, and social aspects. In addition, the company 
points to commissioned studies on the socio-ecological influences of the eucalyptus 
plantations and the special protection of threatened species. According to Appendix III of 
the CIMGC resolution, sustainability criteria will also be used to meet several objectives 
in the biomass production.154 The precise criteria and objectives are not explained more 
fully in the Appendix III. Finally, Plantar S.A. mentions the five environmental licenses 
151According to Plantar S.A., the reduction of methane will be almost 50 percent. “Anexo III da 
Resolução No 1 da Comissão Interministerial de Mudança Global do Clima. Contribuição do Projeto de 
Mitigação de Emissões de Metano na Produção de Carvão Vegetal da Plantar, Fevereiro 2007,” [Appendix 
III of Resolution No. 1 of the Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change. Contribution Project 
Mitigation of Methane Emissions in the Charcoal Production of Plantar, February 2007] accessed March 1, 





                                                 
granted to the company for its plantations by the respective authorities, which determine 
a part of the legal framework for the project. 
As far as job creation and the development of social working conditions, which is 
the second requirement of Appendix III, Plantar S.A. states it is able to generate 
approximately 1,000 jobs per year for the rural population for the designated 28-year 
duration of the project. The workers would be needed both in the forestry sector and in 
charcoal production. A further 200 jobs per year could be created in the company’s pig 
iron production. Appendix III also emphasizes the good technical and hygienic 
equipment of the workplace. Other benefits for employees are comprehensive medical 
care and free transportation to the workplace. Also, the company’s employees receive a 
monthly distribution of food staples, in-house education and promotion programs, 
physical training, and, if necessary, compensation benefits.155 Plantar S.A. also has 
policies and programs for comprehensive, social activities in the region, such as 
prevention of accidents and environmental protection.156 
Regarding the contribution to income distribution, the third requirement of 
Appendix III, Plantar S.A. states that the company prefers to work with local enterprises 
for the internal supply of materials, products, and services. Thus, the company 
contributes to a better distribution of income in the region, which relates to the indirect 
creation of jobs. In addition, the CDM project contributes to a better quality of life, as 
rising incomes significantly improve the quality of life of many families and residents in 
the region of the project. For comparison purposes, Plantar S.A. points to a reference 
scenario with otherwise low economic activity of the region and a low per capita income 
of the local population.157 
  
155“Anexo III da Resolução Nº 1 da Comissão Interministerial de Mudança Global do Clima. 
Contribuição do Projeto de Mitigação de Emissões de Metano na Produção de Carvão Vegetal da Plantar, 




                                                 
Regarding the fourth requirement of Appendix III, Plantar S.A. emphasizes the 
use of improved technologies. These improvements include the in-house developed 
enhancements of the furnaces and a technical improvement of the production process. In 
particular, the training and development of the staff personnel, as well as the introduction 
of instruments for measuring and monitoring the temperatures and emissions are included 
in the new features. According to Plantar S.A., the new technologies are based on 
external scientific investigations that have been carried out over a period of two years. 
These studies have confirmed an associated reduction in methane emissions.158 
Furthermore, Plantar S.A. evaluates the development of new technologies and their 
application to the charcoal production as a result of the direct incentive and merit through 
the CDM.159 
In connection with the regional integration and the impact of the CDM project to 
other sectors, the fifth requirement of Appendix III, the company states that the project 
promotes two issues. On the one hand, the project has been successful concerning the 
creation and maintenance of rural jobs in the plantations. On the other hand, with the 
charcoal production, it provides an essential raw material for the making of pig iron. (Pig 
iron is used in the iron, steel, and auto industries in southeastern Brazil, as well as in 
Asia, Europe, and the United States.) In this way, the company secures a majority of the 
urban and industrial jobs in the region of Belo Horizonte.  
At the micro-regional level, thanks to the decentralized procurement policy of the 
company, the project has positive effects on the local communities and businesses. The 
meals for the company’s workers are bought exclusively in the neighboring communities. 
In addition, the company supports other local services, for example, transportation and 
the processing of wood. Therefore, according to Plantar S.A., the project promotes the 
socio-economic integration of urban and rural areas, such as regional development and 
the creation of direct and indirect jobs in industry, agriculture, and services.160 
158Ibid., 9. 
159“Anexo III da Resolução n 1 da Comissão Interministerial de Mudança Global do Clima. 
Contribuição do Projeto de Mitigação de Emissões de Metano na Produção de Carvão Vegetal da Plantar, 
Fevereiro 2007,” accessed March 1, 2014, http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0019/19345.pdf, 9, 13. 
160Ibid., 14. 
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2. PDD Analysis 
Overall, there are some similarities in both documents. Section D of the PDD 
describes the environmental impacts of the project. According to the PDD of Plantar 
S.A., the project has no negative impacts on the environment. Therefore, a certification 
by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is utilized to guarantee a sufficient control of 
the plantations in terms of their social, environmental, and economic compatibility.161 
Like Appendix III, Section D.2 of the PDD is referring to the expected positive social 
impacts of the project. In addition, the indicators of the assessment concerning the 
sustainability impacts are mirrored in both documents. The health program of the 
company, which aims to ensure comprehensive health care for the employees, is 
especially emphasized. As in Appendix III to the PDD, the high sustainability benefits of 
the project both for the region and for the Brazilian nation are highlighted.162 
Section E.1 of the PDD describes the procedure of the stakeholder consultations. 
According to the PDD, the stakeholder consultation took place in two phases.163 The first 
round of consultations was conducted in October 2001. In accordance with the 
requirements of the CIMGC, the second phase of the stakeholder consultation took place 
between November and December 2006. During both phases, the PDDs were made 
available for public comments on the websites of the PCF, the UNFCCC, and of Plantar 
S.A.. Subsequently, in the Section E.2 of the PDD, all received comments from the 
stakeholders are summarized. In the first phase of the consultation, the stakeholders have 
emphasized the overall need to fulfill the sustainability goals of the project at the local 
and regional level. 
161“Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-PDD) Version 03.1, 
UNFCCC,” accessed March 1, 2014, http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0022/22065.pdf, 49. 
162“Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-PDD) Version 03.1, 
UNFCCC,” 49. 
163The comments were solicited during the first phase of the project activities regarding renewable 
forestry in the eucalyptus plantations for the production of charcoal for pig iron production. In the second 
phase comments were requested regarding the project component of reforestation as a renewable energy 
source for the industry in Brazil and with respect to the project component reduction of methane emissions 
in charcoal production; “Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-PDD) 
Version 03.1, UNFCCC,” 50. 
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According to the PDD, the comments of the stakeholders are related to two major 
topics: the components of reforestation as a renewable energy source and the components 
of the use of wood for the production of charcoal for pig iron manufacturing. Moreover, 
the stakeholders did not make any comments regarding the project objectives for 
reducing methane emission from charcoal production. Unfortunately, from the PDD 
documents, it is not possible to extract the concerns that were expressed in reference to 
the approval of the project. For the second phase of the consultation, the comments relate 
to the component of reforestation as a renewable energy source and the reduction of 
methane emissions in charcoal production. Some stakeholders recommend the 
sustainability benefits of the project for the region as a positive example for other 
companies.164 According to the PDD, the stakeholders’ comments relate primarily to the 
environmentally friendly use of the company’s technology. 
According to the PDD, the Environmental Council of Itacambira urged Plantar 
S.A. to update the list of environmental protection zones in its documents. The non-
governmental organization (NGO) Brazilian Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations 
and Social Movements for the Environment and Development (Fórum Brasileiro de 
ONGs e Movimentos Sociais para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável e Meio Ambiente—
FBOMS)165 declared its strong interest to examine the documents provided by the 
company. However, FBOMS pointed out, due to a lack of technical and financial support 
from the government, it would not be able to conduct the examination of the company`s 
documents. Therefore, the comment of FBOMS in regards of the PDD only includes the 
164Community center of Vargem Grande (Itacambira), the communitarian association of Melerio 
(Curvelo), the Municipal School Duque de Caxias (Morada Nova de Minas), the Campo Alegre 
Community (Curvelo), and the Itacambira Environmental Council (CODEMA); “Clean Development 
Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-PDD) Version 03.1, UNFCCC,” 53. 
165The Brazilian Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations and Social Movements for the 
Environment and Development (FBOMS) was founded in 1990 in order to facilitate the participation of 
Brazilian civil society groups during the 1992 Conference of the United Nations for the Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro. 
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proposal to use the gold standard criteria166 or other additional sustainability criteria for 
the project. 
In the Section E.3, information must be provided regarding the implementation or 
consideration of stakeholder comments received. In this section, it is stated that no 
specific or relevant comments from the first consultation phase had been submitted. 
Consequently, no changes would have been necessary to be implemented. According to 
the PDD, all comments that have been received and the corresponding answers will be 
published on the website of the PCF. Likewise, the most important information and 
reports on forest certification on the website of an independent certification authority will 
be published.167 
According to the PDD, the comments that have been received from the second 
phase were answered immediately. The requirements of the Environmental Council of 
Itacambira would have been promptly met by the adaptation of detailed maps of the 
environmental protection zones in the region of Itacambira. The technical representatives 
of FBOMS were invited for a visit of the project sites. The recommendation of the NGO 
to use additional sustainability criteria was answered with a reference to the certifications 
of plantations by the FSC and the use of social and environmental indicators.168 
On the basis of the analyzed PDD, the CIMGC initiated the issuance of the LoA. 
Since the Brazilian DNA only evaluates validated PDDs, it can be assumed that the 
investigated PDD has been checked by the Designated Operational Entity (DOE) Det 
Norske Veritas and has been approved accordingly. An examination of the validation 
166The Gold Standard is a standard for creating high-quality emission reductions projects in the Clean 
Development Mechanism Joint Implementation and Voluntary Carbon Market. It was designed to ensure 
that carbon credits are not only real and verifiable but that they make measurable contributions to 
sustainable development worldwide. Its objective is to add branding, a label to existing and new Carbon 
Credits generated by projects, which can then be bought and traded by countries that have a binding legal 
commitment according to the Kyoto Protocol. 




                                                 
report confirms this assumption. There is no objection concerning the stakeholder 
involvement or the sustainability benefits of the project.169 
As mentioned previously, a second international phase of stakeholder consultation 
was carried out. The DOE has the responsibility to make the project documentation 
available to the public at the international level during the validation process. Therefore, 
for a period of 30 days, international stakeholders can make comments and express their 
concerns about the project. According to the DOE, during this phase, no comments on the 
project were transmitted.170 
The official document analysis can be utilized to clarify the company’s official 
view regarding the sustainability benefits of its CDM project. The investigation of 
Appendix III, the PDD, and the validation report shows that Plantar S.A. and the DOE 
Det Norske Veritas evaluate the project in an especially positive manner. Possible 
negative effects on people and the environment of the region are not mentioned anywhere 
in the official documents. 
B. THE UTE-BARREIRO PROJECT 
The company Vallourec & Mannesmann do Brasil S.A. was founded in 2000 as a 
subsidiary company of Vallourec & Mannesmann Tubes.171 The company is the global 
market leader in the production of seamless steel tubes. Currently, V&M do Brasil owns 
approximately 587,500 acres of land in the state of Minas Gerais. Like Plantar S.A., 
V&M do Brasil uses the landholding for the cultivation of eucalyptus trees. These 
eucalyptus plantations cover the entire timber needs of the company and are led by 
another subsidiary company (V&M Florestal). Moreover, the plantations of the company 
169“Validation Report: Mitigation of Methane Emissions in the Charcoal Productions of Plantar in 




171Vallourec & Mannesmann Tubes is a joint venture of the French Vallourec Group (with a share of 
55 percent) and the German Mannesmann tube works (with a share of 45 percent); “Clean Development 
Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-PDD),” UTE Barreiro S.A. Renewable Electricity 
Generation Project, Version 4, prepared by EcoSecurities Ltd, 2005, accessed March 3, 2014, 
http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0021/21393.pdf, 4. 
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V&M Florestal have been certified by the FSC.172 Consequently, V&M do Brasil makes 
use of its own eucalyptus plantations for the production of charcoal and steel.  
The CDM project entails the construction and operation of a thermoelectric plant. 
In addition, it is expected to generate electricity for the steel plant of the company, which 
is located in the community Barreiro de Baixo in Belo Horizonte. The plant is fueled with 
excess wood tar and blast furnace gas to produce energy. Both, the blast furnace gas, as 
well as the tar emerges as a by-product of the steel and charcoal production.  
The Executive Board approved and registered this CDM project of V&M do 
Brasil on January 22, 2006. Previously, the responsible DOE Det Norske Veritas had 
been asked four times to review the submitted documents. Like in the Plantar S.A. case, 
the reworking of the project documents included two issues: the more accurate 
representation of project benefits and the rationale for further consideration of the CDM 
criteria. The project has the capacity to generate 20.5 million tons of CO2 emission 
reduction equivalents over a 21-year timeframe. This is broken down as 15.8 million tons 
CO2 from fuel switch for the industrial activities (use of charcoal as opposed to coke), 
and 4.7 million tons CO2 from the capture of methane in carbonization activities.173 
The CIMGC provided a LoA in September 2005 and confirmed officially the 
sustainability benefits of the CDM project of the company V&M do Brasil for the 
country.174 Accordingly, it must be assumed that the CIMGC was satisfied with the 
examination of the PDD and the Appendix III of the LoA. Appendix III is, as in the case 
of the Plantar S.A. project, only available in Portuguese and is accessible only for 
stakeholders with knowledge of the Portuguese language.  
172Ibid., 13. 
173“CDM Project Portfolio for Brazil,” UN Interagency PROJECT GLO/99/H06 (Brazil), 2003, 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), accessed March 3, 2014, 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/import/12897_Brazil_portfolio_UNIDO.pdf, 53. 
174“V&M do Brasil-Letter of Approval,” Federative Republic of Brazil Interministerial Commission 
on Global Climate Change, 2005. 
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1. Appendix III 
V&M do Brasil claims in Appendix III175 of the LoA contributions to: 
• local ecological sustainability 
• job creation and development of social working conditions 
• income distribution 
• education and technological development  
• regional integration and the impact of the project on other sectors 
In regard to the contribution to the local ecological sustainability, V&M do Brasil 
states that the company initiated an environmental impact assessment to be able to 
estimate the direct environmental consequences and impacts of the project in an adequate 
manner. The following effects have been studied in the context of this examination: air 
quality and the consumption of fossil fuels, the level of ambient noise, water quality, 
biodiversity, and socio-economic and socio-political implications. 
According to Appendix III, negative effects have been found with reference to the 
ambient noise. In particular, the workers in the plant and the neighboring communities 
had to suffer from the specific noise conditions. Therefore, to prevent physical harm, the 
workers must wear special protective and safety clothing. It is also argued that the 
planted eucalyptus forest absorbs the noise of the industrial plant and thus protects the 
public from excessive noise. According to V&M do Brasil, all these protective measures 
are tested and monitored on a regular basis.176 In contrast, the impact on flora and fauna 
is assessed as low, as the system is integrated into an old existing building of the V&M 
Steel plant. As an additional negative impact, V&M do Brasil describes the possibility of 
environmental pollution due to leakages at the storing sites of the stocked tar. But the 
company emphasizes its reliable sealing devices and its contingency plan. The pollution 
of waters is prevented by an appropriate treatment of the wastewater.177 
175“Anexo III da Resolução N°1 da CIMGC – Projeto Barreiro,” [Appendix III of Resolution No. 1 of 
CIMGC - Barreiro Project] accessed April 6, 2014, http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0017/17922.pdf.  
176“V&M do Brasil-Letter of Approval,” Federative Republic of Brazil Interministerial Commission 
on Global Climate Change, 2005, 2. 
177Ibid. 
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According to V&M do Brasil, the CDM project is not a new source of emissions, 
because within the production process, the blast furnace gas is burned in the chimneys 
before it can escape into the atmosphere. Furthermore, the combustion of wood tar 
generates less than 7 percent of new emissions. Because the system already uses existing 
by-products or surpluses to generate electricity, it is not necessary to draw power from 
other sources. Consequently, the project uses two renewable fuels for the production of 
electricity.178 
Overall, the project activity has the potential to reduce the energy demand of the 
company. Therefore, the purchasing of electricity from the energy companies of Minas 
Gerais (Companhia Energética de Minas Gerais, CEMIG) will be reduced from 350,400 
MWh per year to 258,000 MWh per year—a savings of 92,400 MWh per year. 
According to the reference scenario, without the project activity, both the blast furnace 
gas as well as the tar would be burned and the emission would be released into the 
atmosphere. 
Finally, V&M do Brasil comes to the conclusion that the positive effects of the 
project would outweigh a negative impact (noise), and so the project activities are to be 
assessed positively in comparison to the reference scenario.179 
Concerning the project’s contribution to job creation and the development of 
social working conditions, V&M do Brasil states that the company will be able to 
generate, in a first step, ten new jobs through the construction, use, and maintenance of 
the system. Furthermore, the company assumes that indirect jobs will be generated. The 
company claims to initiate investments for the education and health of the people with the 
help of control programs and donations. In addition to educational campaigns, V&M do 
Brasil supports numerous institutions such as a kindergarten, which serves about 70 
children in the industrial area.180 According to V&M do Brasil, the founding of the 
Committee for the Integration of the Community (Comitê de Integração com a 
178Ibid., 3. 
179“V&M do Brasil-Letter of Approval,” Federative Republic of Brazil Interministerial Commission 
on Global Climate Change, 2005, 6. 
180Ibid., 6. 
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Comunidade—CINCO) should help, “to prevent or minimize any potential negative 
effects on the operation of the company.”181 The responsibilities of the Committee 
include the creation of greater transparency of the company, the provision of assistance 
for the disadvantaged and the promotion of general social integration. V&M do Brasil 
also points to its product certification and environmental protection of about 206,000 m2 
of agricultural land that would be used for environmental education. In addition, the 
company is involved in numerous art and cultural projects. In relation to all activities 
described in the Appendix III, the company`s engagement lead to local job creation and 
the integration of the people neighboring communities of the project.182 
Regarding the third requirement of Appendix III, V&M do Brasil states that the 
creation of jobs and the implementation of social activities would improve local 
distribution of income. The participation and integration of different social classes would 
contribute significantly to this outcome.183 At the national level, in reference to the 
Ministry of Mining and Energy, the use of renewable energy would also contribute to a 
better distribution of income.184 The company emphasizes that its competitive force 
would rise through the CERs from the project, and therefore, it could contribute to a more 
sustainable and equitable society. 
Concerning the contribution to training and technological development, the fourth 
requirement of Appendix III, V&M do Brasil emphasizes that it would be the first project 
in which both blast furnace gas and tar are used to generate energy.185 Furthermore, the 
project would use technology that originates 100 percent in Brazil. Consequently, the 
project especially promotes the national industry. After describing the exact process 
technology for combustion of blast furnace gas and wood tar, it should be noted that no 
technical support or licenses from abroad are necessary for the project activity, as the 
181Ibid., 7. 
182Wittger, “Der Clean Development Mechanism in Brasilien – Nachhaltigkeitsstandards in Theorie 
und Praxis,” 56. 
183“V&M do Brasil-Letter of Approval,” Federative Republic of Brazil Interministerial Commission 
on Global Climate Change, 2005, 9. 
184Wittger, “Clean Development Mechanism in Brasilien,” 56. 
185“V&M do Brasil-Letter of Approval,” 10. 
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process would be considered to be a Brazilian innovation. For the state of Minas Gerais, a 
further spread of this procedure is already underway. 
As far as regional integration and the impact of the project to other sectors, which 
is the fifth requirement of Appendix III, V&M do Brasil notes the increasing problems of 
sufficient power supply in Brazil. In reference to the 2001 government’s implementation 
of electricity rationing, the company emphasizes the need for alternative power 
generation for the future of Brazil.186 With the help of the electrical self-sufficiency of 
the company, the energy otherwise taken from the local power grid for V&M do Brasil, 
could now be used for the energy supply of approximately 45,000 people. V&M do 
Brasil considers the integration of its own generation of energy within a steel company as 
an important integration of two different industrial sectors, as well as improving relations, 
dialogue, and cooperation between the two sectors. Like Plantar S.A., V&M do Brasil 
emphasizes the project’s positive effects on the environment, workers, and the economy 
in great detail. In addition, the benefits and commitments to the region’s population are 
particularly emphasized. 
2. PPD Analysis 
The assignment of each section in the PPD of V&M do Brasil differs from the 
PPD of Plantar S.A. in name only. In the case of V&M do Brasil, the environmental 
impact of the project is described in Section F (instead of E) and the stakeholder`s 
involvement is discussed in Section G (rather than in Section E). According to the PDD, 
after a supposedly detailed examination and the preparation of a report on the 
environmental impact, a negative impact of the project on the environment is considered 
to be not relevant. Moreover, this document provides a summary of the effects and the 
countermeasures concerning the CDM project.187 
  
186Ibid., 11. 
187 Wittger, “Der Clean Development Mechanism in Brasilien – Nachhaltigkeitsstandards in Theorie 
und Praxis,” 57. 
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Overall, the description of stakeholder involvement in the PDD of the project of 
the V&M do Brasil is strikingly low. The content of Section G.1, which includes the 
description of the method concerning stakeholder involvement, is limited to the statement 
that all stakeholders were invited by mail or fax to submit comments regarding the 
project. Accordingly, in Section G.2, only brief remarks are made. This section merely 
points to the absence of stakeholder comments. Thus, as a consequence, Section G.3 
shows no statements concerning the implementation or consideration of the comments 
received.188  
On the basis of the analyzed PDD, the CIMGC initiated the LoA. Accordingly, 
because the Brazilian DNA only evaluates validated PDDs, it has to be assumed that the 
DOE Det Norske Veritas checked the investigated PDD and approved it accordingly. As 
in the Plantar S.A. case, an examination of the validation report confirms this assumption. 
There is no objection concerning the stakeholder involvement or the sustainability 
benefits of the project.189 
The analysis of Appendix III, the PDD, and the validation report shows that V&M 
do Brasil as well as the DOE Det Norske Veritas assess that the project has especially 
positive effects. In contrast to the statements of Plantar S.A., at least possible adverse 
effects on the environment of the region are initially mentioned. The following section 
describes the contents of the corporate documents as well as the congruence with the 
requirements of CIMGC.  
The analysis of the official documents shows that two very different descriptions 
of the project and reality exist. Consequently, in both projects serious doubts about the 
quality of the sustainability and quality of stakeholder involvement occur. In accordance 
with the requirements of the CIMGC in terms of contribution to local environmental 
sustainability, Plantar S.A. describes and evaluates the climate impact of the project in 
comparison to the estimated climate change mitigation effect of the reference scenario. It 
188“V&M do Brasil-Letter of Approval,” 35. 
189“Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-PDD),” UTE Barreiro 
S.A. Renewable Electricity Generation Project, Version 4 Prepared by EcoSecurities Ltd, August 2005, 
accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0021/21393.pdf, 8. 
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is striking that although the existence of a monitoring plan is highlighted, its more 
accurate description, however, fails to appear. The same peculiarity is found in the 
sustainability criteria listed in Appendix III. These are also not explained in detail. In this 
way, the description of these parameters remains superficial and less than satisfactory. In 
contrast, Plantar S.A. assesses the requirements of Appendix III concerning the working 
conditions, quality of life, and regional development, as largely satisfactory. Overall, the 
company’s commitment to its employees, the quality of working conditions, and the 
contribution of the project to regional development is presented in a strikingly positive 
manner. 
The technological innovations are compared in sufficient detail to the reference 
scenario. However, it becomes clear that it is hardly possible for the layman to make a 
serious examination and evaluation of the descriptions of the implemented technology. In 
contrast to the claims of the CIMCG, the origin of the technology, its reproducibility, the 
existence of license fees, and the need for support by skilled personnel are not addressed. 
In the PDD, as already shown in Appendix III, the positive impacts of the project are 
repeated to a large extent, although this is not explicitly required. It seems as if the 
companies try, wherever possible, to emphasize the positive aspects of their projects. 
With regard to the stakeholder comments, a more detailed and substantive explanation is 
not provided. Consequently, it is not possible to extract important information from the 
PDD; instead, external documents have to be examined. 
Similarly, V&M do Brasil is committed to a detailed description of the 
sustainability benefits of its project in Appendix III. Unlike Plantar S.A., V&M do Brasil 
attempts to use a different tactic. With the presentation of possible risks in Appendix III, 
the company tries to forestall possible critiques against the project. Wherever possible, in 
line with Plantar S.A., V&M do Brasil highlights its own commitment and the 
sustainability of its own project. In regards to the contribution to the local environmental 
sustainability, V&M do Brasil presents the climate impact of the project in comparison to 
the estimated impact on climate protection in the reference scenario. 
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Concerning the contribution to job creation and the development of social 
working conditions, the creation of a positive image is a major concern of the company. 
However, the company assumes the generation of indirect employment without providing 
further explanations about the numbers and causes. Regarding the contribution to income 
distribution, V&M do Brasil refers less specifically to the direct and indirect socio-
economic effects for the population with low incomes. Moreover, the company describes 
the effects on jobs and the national economy in a rather general manner. For the layman, 
the explanation of the technological innovations lacks of traceability. In contrast to the 
descriptions of Plantar S.A., V&M do Brasil presents detailed information on the origin 
of the technology, its reproducibility, the existence of license fees, and the need for 
support by international experts. 
With regard to the regional integration and the impact of the project on other 
sectors, V&M do Brasil only makes quite general remarks and rather represents the 
usefulness of the project for the Brazilian power supply. The comments on the 
environmental impacts of the project, which have already been made in Appendix III, are 
repeated in the PDD. Due to its brevity, the description of stakeholder involvement 
particularly is striking. With the respective issuing of a LoA, the CIMGC confirmed the 
positive contribution to sustainability of both CDM projects in Brazil. Considering only 
the documents examined here as a basis for decision, such an assessment is quite 
understandable. Furthermore, except for some very general formulations and less detailed 
representations, the companies are eager to portray only the positive effects of the 




There has been strong criticism and public denunciation of the two projects, 
which is initially surprising since there are no negative comments from stakeholders in 
either the companies’ PDD or in Appendix III regarding a lack of sustainability 
benefits.190 This is especially remarkable in the case of Plantar S.A., as the stakeholder 
criticism was clearly put forward between the first phase of the stakeholder consultation 
in October 2001 and the second phase between November and December 2006 in at least 
four letters to the PCF. Therefore, the lack of consideration of the commentary by 
international stakeholders is surprising. At least the CIMGC should have noticed during a 
regular examination of the Plantar S.A. project that there is severe criticism of the 
sustainability benefits. The complete lack of negative criticism remains more than 
dubious. The same observation applies to V&M do Brasil. The lack of stakeholder 
criticism is again very surprising. The public criticism of the project, which was 
accessible on the Internet, took place on June 13, 2007—after the official phase of 
stakeholder participation. As mentioned earlier, international NGOs criticized the lack of 
participation concerning the formal stakeholder process. Therefore, a subsequent voicing 
of criticism remains unfortunately without consequences. 
If the criticism of the stakeholders were actually true, it would be considered a 
subversion of the sustainability benefits through the CIMGC, the DOE, and the 
companies Plantar S.A. and V&M do Brasil. In such a manner and despite correct 
application, the Brazilian sustainability standards would lead to non-sustainable projects 
and would be worthless in their current form. In light of the criticisms, it seems essential 
to verify the provided information on site. It seems as if the CIMGC decided exclusively 
on the basis of the submitted documents.191 Furthermore, it is striking that a 
parliamentary commission of inquiry was able to find significant deficiencies in the 
quality of working conditions. This supports the critiques with particular importance and 
increases the doubts that the CIMGC lacks sufficiency of care. Therefore, a local review 
190Wittger, “Der Clean Development Mechanism in Brasilien – Nachhaltigkeitsstandards in Theorie 
und Praxis,” 63. 
191Ibid., 64. 
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of the information provided in Appendix III by the DNA is of crucial importance. 
Obviously, a pure self-assessment of the sustainability benefits by the companies cannot 
guarantee the sustainability of CDM projects. The precondition for a positive 
implementation is that the DNA pursues a serious interest in the sustainability of CDM 
projects and not economic interests. 
In summary, there is reasonable doubt that the CDM is able to achieve its goal of 
sustainable development in Brazil. A crucial reason for this conclusion is the fundamental 
difficulty of finding a generally accepted definition of sustainability. A generally 
accepted and “ideal” evaluation of sustainability benefits is not possible until a uniform 




V. GERMAN-BRAZILIAN COOPERATION 
Brazil is the only country in Latin America that has a Strategic Partnership with 
Germany. In May 2008, Germany and Brazil signed an Action Plan for the Strategic 
Partnership, and subsequently, both countries agreed to expand the partnership in the 
bilateral and multilateral spheres.192 
The quality of different bilateral projects and the high number of actors involved 
in the German-Brazilian partnership show the importance of bilateral cooperation for 
both countries.193 The engagement differs significantly in intensity and breadth from the 
commitment of the EU to Brazil. Compared to the Strategic Partnership between Brazil 
and the EU, the bilateral relations between Germany and Brazil are far more 
comprehensive and diverse.  
Bilateral relations between Germany and Brazil have a long tradition, and the two 
states share more than 500 years of history, which began with German immigration to 
Brazil in the sixteenth century.194 (The immigration connection continues to have a 
positive effect on German-Brazilian relations.) Since the 1960s, this alliance has 
experienced a substantial consolidation through the commitment of the German 
economy.195 The mutual relations are widely anchored in the political, economic, cultural 
and social space. These relations are based on shared social values and a compatible view 
of a global, multi-polar order. The bilateral cooperation is structured comprehensively 
192“Aktionsplan der deutsch-brasilianischen strategischen Partnerschaft,” [Action Plan of the German-
Brazilian Strategic Partnership] Brasilia, 2008, accessed March 14, 2014, 
http://www.brasil.diplo.de/contentblob/3022910/Daten/1605301/2008_strategische_partnerschaft_de.pdf, 
1. 
193“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland—Politische Beziehungen,” [Relations between 
Brazil and Germany—Political Relations] Auswärtiges Amt [Federal Foreign Office], accessed April 22, 
2014, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Brasilien 
/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.    
194Boris Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 22.  
195Speech of German ambassador Wilfried Grolig from Brasilia during a panel discussion of the 
German Society for Foreign Policy, Forum Baden-Württemberg, and the Brazilian Honorary Consulate in 
Baden-Württemberg, Tuesday, October 22, 2013 in Stuttgart, 
http://www.brasil.diplo.de/Vertretung/brasilien/de/02__Brasilia/31.10.13_20Rede_20BO_20Stuttgart.html.  
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and covers such topics as international crisis management, economics, energy, climate 
and environment, defense, labor and social affairs, and human rights.  
Taking advantage of budget funds from the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation (BMZ) and the International Climate Initiative (ICI), Germany and Brazil 
are working closely together concerning the protection of tropical forests, the promotion 
of renewable energy sources, and the advancement of energy efficiency.196 Furthermore, 
the bilateral inter-governmental cooperation focuses particularly on the exchange of 
scientific-technological and cultural issues.197 In addition, there are numerous contacts 
between the NGOs of both countries. 
A. POLITICAL RELATIONS 
Germany and Brazil maintain active personnel exchanges at the political level.198 
For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited the country in May 2008 and 
took the opportunity to sign the Action Plan of the Strategic Partnership and a bilateral 
energy agreement.199 In early December 2009, Brazil`s President Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva conducted a state visit to Germany. During this visit, numerous agreements were 
signed. In more detail, these agreements include the areas of legal assistance, social 
security, public safety, economic cooperation, the fight against climate change, as well as 
technology and innovation. Especially in the area of infrastructure and security, the major 
focus was on the three big upcoming events for Brazil: the Soccer World Cup in 2014, 
the XXXI Olympic Games, and the XV Paralympics in 2016. In March 2012, together 
196“Brasilien—Situation und Zusammenarbeit,” [Brazil—Situation and Cooperation] 
Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit [Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development], accessed March 14, 2014, http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen 
/lateinamerika/brasilien/zusammenarbeit.html.   
197“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland—Politische Beziehungen,” Auswärtiges Amt, 
accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Brasilien/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.   
198“Aktuelle Informationen zu den deutsch-brasilianischen bilateralen Beziehungen,” [Latest 
Information on the German-Brazilian Bilateral Relations] Vertretungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in 
Brasilien [Representations of the Federal Republic of Germany in Brazil], accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.brasil.diplo.de/Vertretung/brasilien/de/07__Aussenpolitik/Bilaterale__Beziehungen/Bilaterale_
_Beziehungen.html.  
199“Aktionsplan der deutsch-brasilianischen strategischen Partnerschaft,” Brasilia, 2008, accessed 
March 14, 2014, http://www.brasil.diplo.de/contentblob/3022910/Daten 
/1605301/2008_strategische_partnerschaft_de.pdf.  
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with Chancellor Merkel, President Dilma Rousseff opened the world’s largest trade fair 
for information technology (Center for Office Automation, Information Technology and 
Telecommunications—CeBIT) in Hanover, with Brazil participating as the fair’s partner 
country.200 
The current German-Brazilian Year 2013/2014 aims to present both states as 
modern, cosmopolitan, and diverse nations. In May 2013, during his visit to Brazil, 
German President Joachim Gauck launched a series of events titled “Germany and 
Brazil—where ideas come together.”201 At the political level of cooperation, numerous 
visits by federal ministers, parliamentarians, and state politicians contribute to the 
substantive dialogue within German-Brazilian relations.  
In many issues on the international agenda, Brazil and Germany work closely 
together,202 including on the reform of the United Nations, the expansion of the Security 
Council with new permanent and non-permanent members, and the reform of the global 
financial order. Cooperation in the international climate and environmental policy forms 
another touchstone of the German-Brazilian comity. In addition, within the G20 
conferences, important issues are discussed concerning the financial, currency, and global 
economic policy.203  
B. ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Brazil is Germany’s most important trading partner in Latin America. Since 2009, 
the bilateral trade has grown following a temporary decline in the wake of the economic 
and monetary crisis. Over the last years, Germany’s exports to Brazil were quite stable 
200Denise Schmidt, “CeBit: Brasilien als Partnerland 2012,” [CeBit: Brazil as a Partner Country in 
2012] BrasilNews, Besser International GmbH, accessed March 14, 2014, http://www.brasilnews.de/cebit-
brasilien-als-partnerland-2012-2012/.  
201Claudio Struck, “Deutschland + Brasilien 2013–2014,” [Germany + Brazil 2013–2014] accessed 
April 22, 2014, http://www.alemanha-brasil.org/br.  
202“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland—Politische Beziehungen,” Auswärtiges Amt, 
accessed March 14, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Brasilien/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.   
203“GRUPPE DER ZWANZIG—Die G20,” [GROUP OF TWENTY—The G20] Die 




                                                 
and, in 2013, totaled approximately $15.2 billion. This sum represents an increase of 0.4 
percent over 2012.204 In comparison, in 2013, German imports from Brazil amounted to 
$11.9 billion, a decline of nearly 13 percent. As an importer of German goods, in 2013, 
Brazil was ranked 20, and as exporter it was ranked 23.205 The main export goods of 
Brazil for the German market are iron ore, soybeans and soy products, coffee and coffee 
products, automobile parts, civilian aircraft, machinery, meat, copper, and crude oil. 
Brazil’s imports from Germany are mainly machinery, automobiles and auto parts, 
chemical raw materials, and pharmaceutical products. 
In 2012, Germany’s direct investments amounted to $2.03 billion. Including the 
reinvestments, the total stock of German direct investments came to more than $27 
billion.206 Brazilian direct investments in Germany have been negligible but are 
increasing. In Brazil, about 1,400 German-Brazilian companies employ more than 
250,000 people. Moreover, with more than 1,200 German companies, São Paulo is one of 
the largest German business locations worldwide.207 
In Brazil, the association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry has 
established joint German-Brazilian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which are 
based in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Porto Alegre. In addition, smaller organizations 
exist, inter alia, in Recife. Furthermore, a branch office of Germany Trade and Invest 
204“Aus- und Einfuhr (Außenhandel): Deutschland, Jahre, Länder,” [Export and Import (Foreign 






205“Außenhandel—Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” 
[Foreign Trade—Ranking of Trading Partners in Foreign Trade of the Federal Republic of Germany] 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 2014, accessed March 14, 2014, 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/Aussenhandel/Handelspartner/Tabelle
n/RangfolgeHandelspartner.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, 2. 
206“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland—Politische Beziehungen,” Auswärtiges Amt, 
accessed March 14, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Brasilien/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.    
207“Brasilien im Blickpunkt der Weltöffentlichkeit,” [Brazil in the Focus of the International Public] 
Deutsch-Brasilianische Industrie- und Handelkammer, accessed March 14, 2014, 
http://www.ahkbrasilien.com.br/medien-business-center-2014/.   
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(GTAI) is based in São Paulo. The common foreign Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry provide a wide range of information for German companies and investors. They 
offer administrative support and information concerning issues of foreign investment.208 
In contrast, the representation of the EU in Brazil consists only of a delegation based in 
Brasilia.209 
To improve and deepen these bilateral economic relations, German-Brazilian 
Economic Meetings are held on an annual basis.210 Therefore, the Federation of German 
Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie—BDI) and the Brazilian Industry 
Association (Associação Confederação Nacional da Indústria—CNI) are responsible for 
organizing such meetings. In addition, during this event, the German-Brazilian Joint 
Commission conducts its annual meeting on Economic Cooperation. From May 12 to 14, 
2013, under the motto “German Brazilian cooperation to promote competitiveness,” the 
thirty-first German-Brazilian Economic Meetings took place in São Paulo. With more 
than 2,000 participants, this event noted a record number of visitors.211 The highlights of 
the event were the speeches by President Gauck and President Rousseff.  
The next German-Brazilian Economic Meetings are scheduled for the period from 
August 1 to September 2, 2014 in Hamburg.212 The positive response to establishing fairs 
abroad, like the Sustainability Fair ECOGERMA 2012 in São Paulo, strengthens the 
efforts of the German-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce. In regard to innovative topics, 
208“Einschätzung der Markteintrittsmöglichkeiten,” [Assessment of Market Entry Options], Deutsch-
Brasilianische Industrie- und Handelkammer, accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.ahkbrasilien.com.br/dienstleistungen/markteintritt/einschaetzung-der-
markteintrittsmoeglichkeiten/.  
209“Delegation to Brazil,” European External Action Service, Delegation of the European Union to 
Brazil, accessed April 20, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/index_en.htm.  
210“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland—Wirtschaftliche Beziehungen,” [Relations 
between Brazil and Germany—Economic Relations] Auswärtiges Amt, accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Brasilien/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.    
211“Deutsch-Brasilianischen Wirtschaftstage 2013,” [German-Brazilian Business Days 2013] 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V., accessed March 14, 2014, 
http://www.bdi.eu/DBWT2013.htm. 




                                                 
such as urban development, climate change, improvement of environmentally friendly 
and energy-efficient technologies reflects the special German interest in Brazil. 
C. CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION 
The early settlements of German immigrants in the south (Blumenau, Joinville, 
and São Bento do Sul) and northeast (Recife, Fortaleza, and Belem) of the country are of 
particular importance for the cultural links between Germany and Brazil.213 As German-
Brazilian cultural societies, these old German roots make a valuable contribution to the 
cultural presence in Brazil. Starting in 1969, a cultural agreement was signed, and in 
2005, a related supplementary convention on the status of cultural mediators completed 
the agreements.214 The priorities in the cooperation are German language training for 
Brazilian citizens, cultural program work, as well as scientific and academic exchange. 
The prestige of German as a foreign language is relatively strong. German is seen as an 
important European cultural language and it is perceived as a key to professional and 
academic success. The number of students learning the German language has increased 
steadily in recent years.215 Currently, there are six branches of the German Goethe 
Institute in Brazil (Brasília, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador-Bahia, and 
São Paulo). Alone in its branch in São Paulo, the Goethe Institute provides language 
training for more than 3,500 Brazilians.216 
213Vladir Gregory, “Zur deutschen Einwanderung in Brasilien,” [German Immigration to Brazil] 
Edição Especial, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung XIV (2013), accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/10985-1442-1-30.pdf, 115‒118. 
214The language and cultural mediators support the linguistic and cultural communication between 
people with different cultural and language backgrounds, mostly in the strict sense between members of a 
minority or marginalized group, especially migrants, and representatives of prevailing in the country in the 
majority culture, such as employees in government agencies or in medical or social institutions. 
215Christoph Mücher, “Annual Press Conference—Press Portfolio 2012,” Goethe-Institut 
Headquarters, München, 2012, accessed March 16, 2014, 
http://www.goethe.de/prs/pro/pressemappe_jpk2012/pressemappe_jpk2012.pdf.  
216“50 Jahre Goethe-Institut São Paulo,” [50 Years of Goethe-Institut São Paulo] Goethe Institut São 
Paulo, accessed March 24, 2014, http://www.goethe.de/ins/br/sap/uun/jub/de11712563.htm.  
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Today, Brazil is an important partner of the German Academic Exchange Service 
(Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst—DAAD) in Latin America.217 This 
represents an important basis for the cooperation on the academic research level. In 
Brazil, the DAAD maintains partnerships at the federal and state level. Its focus is the 
realization of scientific double degrees and doctorate programs.218 Among the most 
important exchange programs that the DAAD offers together with its Brazilian partners, 
is the scholarship program for Brazilian students. In 2012, more than 2,300 students and 
scientists have participated in DAAD scholarship programs between Brazil and 
Germany.219  
D. RESEARCH COOPERATION 
Within the Latin American region, Brazil is Germany’s most important partner in 
the field of research and science.220 Germany was able to expand its presence in Brazil 
with the implementation of a “German-Brazilian Year of Science, Technology and 
Innovation—2010/2011” and the establishment of the “German Science and Innovation 
House” in São Paulo.221 Through this bilateral engagement in scientific collaboration, 
both countries established a closely intertwined innovation system. In addition, following 
the Year of Science 2010/2011, the “Year of Germany in Brazil 2013/2014” was 
implemented, which also includes an extensive scientific program. Germany’s President 
Joachim Gauck opened the event in Rio de Janeiro in May 2013. 
217“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland—Kulturelle und bildungspolitische 
Zusammenarbeit,” [Relations Between Brazil and Germany—Cultural and Educational Cooperation] 
Auswärtiges Amt, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Brasilien/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.    
218“Brasilien,” [Brazil] Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst [German Academic Exchange 
Service], Länderinformation Brasilien [Country Information Brazil], accessed March 16, 2014, 
https://www.daad.de/laenderinformationen/brasilien/de/. 
219Ibid.  
220“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland—Forschungszusammenarbeit,” [Relations 
Between Brazil and Germany—Research Cooperation] Auswärtiges Amt, accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Brasilien/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.    
221“Das Deutsch-Brasilianische Jahr der Wissenschaft, Technologie und Innovation 2010/2011,” [The 
German-Brazilian Year of Science, Technology and Innovation 2010/2011], Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Forschung [Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy], accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.dbwti.de.  
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German-Brazilian scientific and technological cooperation has been active for 
more than 40 years. It is based on a bilateral framework agreement from 1969, which 
both governments renewed in 1996. The main areas of cooperation are the environment 
and sustainable development.222 
Brazil has become a valued partner of the project-related scientific research 
collaboration. Currently, there are more than 400 university partnerships and bilateral 
cooperative arrangements between research institutions and academic institutions.223 In 
addition, renowned German research institutes are involved in Brazil. For example, 
particularly committed are the Helmholtz Research Foundation (Helmholtz 
Forschungsgemeinschaft–HGF), the German Research Foundation (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft–DFG), the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (FhG), the Max Planck 
Society (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft–MPG), the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation 
(AvH), and the Leopoldina. 
In September 2013, the bilateral Commission for Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation came together for its twenty-eighth meeting in Brasilia. As new priorities for 
research collaboration, the commission determined the areas of bio economy, 
biopharmaceuticals, and rare earth elements. At present, scientists of both countries are 
working on the following major research projects: 
• DINARIO—Climate change, landscape dynamics, land use and natural 
resources in the Atlantic Forest of Rio de Janeiro224 (among others, the 
University of Applied Science Köln, the universities of Leipzig, Jena, and 
222“Grundlagen und Schwerpunkte der deutsch-brasilianischen Kooperation,” [Principles and 
Priorities of the German-Brazilian Cooperation] Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Forschung, 
Internationales Büro, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.internationales-buero.de/de/1002.php. 
223“Das Deutsch-Brasilianische Jahr der Wissenschaft, Technologie und Innovation 2010/2011—
Wissenschaftslandschaft,” Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Forschung, accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.dbwti.de. 
224“DINARIO—Climate Change, Landscape dynamics, Land use and Natural Resources in the 
Atlantic Forest of Rio de Janeiro,” Fachhochschule Köln [Cologne University of Applied Sciences], 
accessed April 20, 2014, http://dinario.fh-koeln.de/index.html.  
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Bonn, EMBRAPA225): integrated approaches concerning the conservation 
and sustainable use of Brazil’s coastal rainforest 
• BRAGECRIM—Brazilian-German Collaborative Research Initiative on 
Manufacturing Technology226 (among others, DFG): cooperation of 30 
scientific institutions from both countries to build a framework program to 
fund and support collaborative projects between German and Brazilian 
research groups in the field of advanced manufacturing technologies 
• ATTO—Amazonian Tall Tower Observatory227 (among others, MPI for 
chemistry Mainz): construction of a 320-meter-high climate tower and 
observatory in the Amazon region to study the air-conditioning function of 
the rainforest 
• BRAMAR228 (among others, the University of Göttingen and the RWTH 
Aachen): implementation of strategies and technologies to reduce water 
scarcity in semi-arid northeastern part of Brazil 
• CarBioCial—Carbon-optimized land management strategies for southern 
Amazonia229 (among others, the universities of Göttingen, Hannover, 
Hamburg, Kassel, Freiberg, Berlin, Kiel, Hohenheim, and Leipzig): the 
project is investigating viable carbon-optimized land management 
strategies to maintain ecosystem services under changing climate 
conditions 
• INNOVATE—Interplay among multiple uses of water reservoirs via 
innovative coupling of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems230 (among 
others, the University of Technology Berlin, the Leibniz-Institute for 
225The Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (EMBRAPA) (Brazilian Enterprise for 
Agricultural Research) is a state-owned company affiliated with the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, 
which is devoted to pure and applied research on agriculture. EMBRAPA conducts agricultural research on 
many topics including animal agriculture and crops. For example, one National Research Center, The 
National Goat Research Center (CNPC) is located in Sobral, Ceará (northeastern Brazil) and conducts 
research on small ruminants, primarily goats and hair sheep.  
226“BRAGECRIM Brief Description,” Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen 
[RWTH Aachen University], accessed April 20, 2014, http://www.bragecrim.rwth-
aachen.de/index.php/home-news.  
227“ATTO,” Max Planck Institute for Chemistry, accessed April 20, 2014, 
http://www.mpic.de/en/research/projects/atto.html.  
228“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland—Politische Beziehungen,” Auswärtiges Amt, 
accessed March 14, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos 
/Brasilien/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.    
229“CarBioCial - Carbon-optimized Land Management Strategies for Southern Amazonia,” 
Universität Göttingen [University of Göttingen], accessed April 20, 2014, http://www.uni-
goettingen.de/de/211024.html. 
230“INNOVATE - Interplay Among Multiple Uses of Water Reservoirs via Innovative Coupling of 
Aquatic and Terrestrial Ecosystems,” Technische Universität Berlin [Technical University of Berlin], 
accessed April 20, 2014, http://www.innovate.tu-berlin.de.  
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Fishing Berlin, the Potsdam Institute für Climate Research, the University 
of Hohenheim, and the University of Applied Science Dresden): 
improvements of agricultural yields, reduction of greenhouse gases, and 
protecting biodiversity with the help of optimized multiple uses of water 
reservoirs for power generation and irrigation 
• INTECRAL—Integrated Eco Technologies and Services for a Sustainable 
Rural Rio de Janeiro231 (among others, the University of Applied Science 
Köln, the Friedrich-Schiller-University of Jena, and the University of 
Leipzig): the project aims to provide solutions in the service and 
technology sectors with the objective of sustainable development in the 
fields of environment and economy in the state of Rio de Janeiro 
• IEPALT—Integration of spent pot liners originating from primary 
aluminum production into the aluminum recycling technology232 (among 
others, the University of Technology Clausthal): development of a method 
for residue-free recycling of the complete electrolysis cells outbreak (coal 
and fireclay) from the melt flow reactors the primary aluminum industry 
Other cooperative projects exist in the fields of marine, aerospace, and 
agricultural research. The Jülich Research Center and the Brazilian Institution for 
Agricultural Research (EMBRAPA) have established, each in the respective host country, 
external branch offices (“external laboratories”). The aim of the establishment of external 
institutions is to represent the entire agricultural research in the partnering country and 
intensify the bilateral cooperation. 
E. COOPERATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The German projects are fully in line with the defined objectives of the 
sustainable development of the EU.233 At the European level, there are no specific 
projects of cooperation in the area of sustainable development. Rather, in accordance 
231“INTECRAL—Integrated Eco Technologies and Services for a Sustainable Rural Rio de Janeiro,” 
Fachhochschule Köln, accessed April 20, 2014, http://www.tt.fh-
koeln.de/research/projects/researchprojectsintecral/.  
232“Integration of Spent Pot Liners Originating from Primary Aluminum Production into the 
Aluminum Recycling Technology, IEPALT,” Technische Universität Clausthal [Technical University of 
Clausthal], Institute of Mineral and Waste Processing, Waste Disposal and Geomechanics, Department of 
Mineral and Waste Processing, accessed April 20, 2014, http://www.ifa.tu-
clausthal.de/en/lehrstuehle/lehrstuhl-fuer-rohstoffaufbereitung-und-recycling/forschung/aktuelle-
projekte/iepalt/.  
233European Commission, “Communication from the Commission A Sustainable Europe for a Better 
World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development (Commission’s proposal to the 
Gothenburg European Council),” COM/2001/0264 final, accessed March 16, 2014, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/sustainable_development/l28117_de.htm.   
 78 
                                                 
with the principle of subsidiarity, the individual European member states fill the 
cooperation with Brazil with life. 
Cooperation for sustainable development between Germany and Brazil focuses on 
joint initiatives for confronting global problems.234 A particular focus is the fight against 
climate change and the protection of biodiversity. The partnership is aimed at the 
protection and sustainable use of tropical forests and the promotion of renewable energy 
and energy efficiency. Currently, numerous specialized German companies are active in 
the area of renewable energy and energy efficiency.235 Consequently, important 
synergies have already been established between the fields of research, technology, and 
business. The German cooperation with Brazil is organized and carried out with the help 
of the Society for International Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit—GIZ), the KfW Development Bank and the German Investment and 
Development Company (Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH—
DEG). 
Since 2008, in addition to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation, the 
Federal Environment Ministry (BMU) has been active within the framework of the 
International Climate Initiative in cooperation with Brazil.236 Research-based innovations 
play an important role. To realize the full potential of this arrangement, it is necessary to 
intensify and systematize the cooperation of science and research with the political, 
business, and civil society. To achieve this goal, the German-Brazilian partnership is 
testing new approaches.237 In the center of the new approaches are the features of 
“innovation” and “sustainability.” Therefore, Germany and Brazil have defined four 
234“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland—Zusammenarbeit für nachhaltige 
Entwicklung,” [Relations between Brazil and Germany—Cooperation for Sustainable Development] 
Auswärtiges Amt, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Brasilien/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.    
235Ibid. 
236“Brasilien—Situation und Zusammenarbeit,” Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit, accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/lateinamerika/brasilien/zusammenarbeit.html.   
237“Das Deutsch-Brasilianische Jahr der Wissenschaft, Technologie und Innovation 2010/2011—
Wissenschaftskooperation,” Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Forschung, accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.dbwti.de. 
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priorities: the promotion of cutting-edge research, the optimization of sustainability in the 
use of resources, the creation of innovative industrial production processes, and the 
commitment to inspire an enthusiasm in young people for the field of science. 
The Brazilian government is making significant investments to expand 
sustainable development. Thus, numerous government programs have been launched, 
such as the “Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation of the Amazon,” 
the “National Plan for the Promotion of Value Chains of Social and Biological 
Diversity,” as well as the social programs “My House, My Life,” “Electricity for All,” 
and the program “Science without Borders.”238 In addition, as Germany has extensive 
experience in the design and implementation of sustainable development policies, it is 
qualified to support the Brazilian approaches. The German efforts are recognized in many 
areas of environmental technology as examples of innovation and global leadership. 
More than 750 publicly funded university and non-university research institutions, as 
well as a variety of research centers of German companies, are the engine of 
technological development and other innovations.239 A special feature of the German 
research landscape is the close connection between research and application. 
German-Brazilian cooperation for sustainable development has set itself the goal 
of making this experience available for the diverse Brazilian research and support 
programs. As part of the German-Brazilian Year of Science, Technology and Innovation 
2010/2011, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the 
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have started the cooperation projects “NoPa—
Novas Parcerias” (New Partnerships).240 The aim of the project is to promote research-
based innovations with highlighted priorities of the German-Brazilian cooperation for 
sustainable development, in particular the issues of “Renewable Energy and Energy 
238“Brazil Scientific Mobility Program,” Institute of International Education, accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.iie.org/Programs/Brazil-Scientific-Mobility/About.  
239“Beziehungen zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland— Zusammenarbeit für nachhaltige 
Entwicklung “ Auswärtiges Amt, accessed March 17, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Brasilien/Bilateral_node.html#doc335300bodyText1.  
240“Programa NoPa – Novas Parcerias CAPES/DAAD/GIZ,” [NoPa Program - New Partnerships 
CAPES/DAAD/GTZ] Coordenação de Comunicação Social (CCS/Capes) [Coordination of Social 
Communication (CCS / CAPES)], accessed March 15, 2014, http://www.capes.gov.br/cooperacao-
internacional/alemanha/nopa.  
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Efficiency” and “Conservation and Sustainable Use of Tropical Forests.” To achieve the 
objectives, the instruments and the networks of Technical Cooperation, as well as the 
Scientific and Technological Cooperation are the basis of concrete German-Brazilian 
research projects, which will be directly linked to each other. Already at the stage of the 
design process of the research funding and scholarship programs, the Brazilian economy 
and the government expressed their demand for research results in the field of sustainable 
development.241 In addition, even during the research phase, the intensive dialogue 
between “producers” and potential “consumers” of research results in business and 
politics is further promoted. Thus, from an early stage, the future users of the results have 
the chance to shape the direction of research, and thereby, contribute to the precision fit 
of usability for innovation. 
The expectations of the mutual relations between Brazil and Germany are high on 
both sides and are observed with interest in an international context. The interests 
pursued by Germany are in line with the EU objectives encompassing its relationship 
with Brazil. Due to the principle of subsidiarity, which is an important part of relations 
between the EU and its member states, specific projects are realized only between the 
member states and Brazil. Subsequently, this raises the question to what extent the EU is 
in a position to monitor the bilateral relations of its member states and to check whether 
the strategic objectives of the EU Strategic Partnership are met. Furthermore, a special 
monitoring procedure is not provided in the documentation for the Strategic Partnership 
between the EU and Brazil. In addition, there is reason to believe that another primary 
interest of the EU is the cooperation with MERCOSUR. This specific issue offers the 
opportunity for further investigation. A similar concern exists on the Brazilian side: 
Brazil would like to conclude a free trade agreement with the EU to further expand the 
mutual economic relations. 
German-Brazilian economic relations are characterized by an extensive 
implementation of specific projects in the political, economic, cultural, and social space. 
241“Entwicklungszusammenarbeit—NoPa und iNoPa,” [Development Cooperation—NoPa and 
iNoPa] Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst, accessed April 22, 2014, 
https://www.daad.de/entwicklung/hochschulen/zusammenarbeit/17068.de.html.  
 81 
                                                 
In practice, however, several weaknesses in the implementation of such projects arise. 
For example, it is evident from several reports of the German business press that German 
companies face significant problems in the establishment of economic cooperation or in 
the establishment of companies in Brazil.242 Consequently, there is room for 
improvement on both sides of the Atlantic. Above all, even politics must facilitate mutual 
access to markets and the implementation of a business-friendly atmosphere. 
In the area of research and educational cooperation, however, there are fewer 
problems, due largely to the commitment of individual academic institutions. 
Furthermore, in this area of cooperation, the realization of economic gains is not the first 
priority. However, sustainable development in this area depends mainly on advertising 
campaigns that illustrate the importance of cooperation. 
The long-standing relations between Germany and Brazil are numerous and 
strong. But it can also be noted that an intensification of the bilateral partnership is 
especially related to the establishment of the right policy environment. The gap between 
the objectives of the cooperation and the practical implementation needs to be reduced 
even further in order to lead to satisfactory results for all sides.  
242Walter and Caulyt, “Brasilien dringt auf EU-Freihandelsabkommen.”  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The preceding pages examine the effects of the anti-deforestation programs on 
Brazil’s economic sustainability goals and the related effects on the objectives for 
sustainable development of the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and the EU. 
Specifically, they assess whether the effects of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism, as implemented in Brazil in order to achieve a reduction in greenhouse 
gases, run counter to the development and sustainability objectives of the Strategic 
Partnership with the EU and might, in fact, slow progress on the reduction of poverty. 
The correlation between climate and economic policy objectives of the Strategic 
Partnership and the practical impact was illustrated with the CDM projects of Plantar 
S.A. and V&M do Brasil. In this context, a special feature highlights the area of 
sustainable development. Moreover, a closer examination of these two specific CDM 
projects in Brazil has shown that the perception of the sustainability benefits of CDM 
projects is mainly influenced by subjective perceptions of all interested parties. Thus, it 
can be stated that the contribution of CDM projects to sustainable development in Brazil 
remains doubtful. In contrast, there is no doubt that the investments related to the CDM 
projects have a direct impact on their region of the country. 
In addition to the interventions in nature, reasonably positive effects on the 
regional and local economy arise. Indeed, regional and local companies are considered in 
the placing of subcontracts and local businesses are integrated into the support chain of 
the CDM project company. Subsequently, the investor also desires these positive effects, 
because these issues can be represented advantageously in the outline of the approval 
documents.243 In addition, whether this will also contribute to a long-term and thus 
sustainably effective contribution to the development of Brazil must be questioned. On 
the one hand, these doubts are directly related to the lack of a generally recognized 
definition of sustainability. Therefore, CDM projects can only be measured and 
compared in terms of sustainable development. Consequently, there is a general problem 
243Wittger, “Der Clean Development Mechanism in Brasilien – Nachhaltigkeitsstandards in Theorie 
und Praxis,” 65‒66. 
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in the operationalization of CDM projects in terms of sustainable development goals. In 
other words: without a common definition, it is not possible to perform corresponding 
operationalization. As long as no single definition of sustainability exists or all parties do 
not accept such a definition, CDM projects can only conditionally be compared with each 
other. 
The examination of the two projects of Plantar S.A. and V&M do Brasil has also 
shown that already in the approval process no uniform assessment criteria were applied. 
Subsequently, it seems, the descriptions of the projects of the companies were adapted so 
that the national licensing authority would more easily agree to an allocation of the 
concession. Secondly, the reasons for doubt on the sustainability benefits are linked to the 
absence of monitoring functions of the CDM process. Neither from the part of the 
Brazilian government, nor from the strategic partnership with the EU, are any procedures 
for monitoring of CDM projects foreseen. Thus, a credible implementation of sustainable 
development is in question as a basic control mechanism is missing, and its 
implementation is also obviously not designated. Therefore, a formal and transparent 
verification of the impact of CDM projects in the field could help here. With an 
appropriate monitoring plan, the contribution of CDM projects to sustainable 
development could be reviewed with little effort. 
Based on the present analysis, it appears that the CDM projects do not have 
positive effects on sustainable development. In light of the objectives of the Strategic 
Partnership between Brazil and the EU, to achieve climate protection goals, the overall 
framework of CDM projects allows a lot of leeway for planning and implementation for 
the companies. Unfortunately, an independent scientific evaluation of the projects is not 
implemented. Thus, the possibility exists that the companies describe the projects with 
exclusively advantageous attributes to come as smoothly as possible through the national 
approval procedures. This kind of behavior seems to be particularly evident in the project 
records of the companies Plantar S.A. and V&M do Brasil, in which the individual 
projects and their impact on the environment, the regional economy, and the social 
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sectors are described very positively.244 In the positive description of the intended effects 
of the projects all of these impacts are shown, but the evidence of the contribution to 
sustainable development in the region cannot be provided. Although this is indeed 
acknowledged by the companies, but not solely due to the lack of generally accepted 
definition of sustainability and the non-existent monitoring of the projects, this argument 
cannot be independently verified prior to granting approval. In particular, the absence of 
a monitoring function in the Strategic Partnership contributes to the fact that an 
appropriate review of the sustainability benefits of CDM projects cannot be furnished. In 
addition, a subsidiary relocation of these functions to the level of the EU member states is 
not mentioned in the documents of the Strategic Partnership. 
This procedure for approval and implementation of CDM projects can be related 
to economic aspects of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Brazil. 
Consequently, the realization of investments, at least in the short term, is coupled with an 
inflow of capital into the region. Also from a short-term view, beneficial effects on the 
regional actors in the economic cycle are also possible. An objective assessment of the 
long-term effects cannot be made, especially concerning the behavior of the company 
subsequent to the return on investment. 
Moreover, a closer examination of the contents of the Strategic Partnership 
between the EU and Brazil reveals that the general formulation of common goals was 
deliberately chosen. On the part of the EU member states, the Strategic Partnership is 
thus only a general framework for the more specific aspect of bilateral partnerships. This 
circumstance can be observed in the example considering the bilateral cooperation 
between Germany and Brazil. While on the EU level, no specific projects of cooperation 
with Brazil are in place, Germany and Brazil signed a number of collaboration 
documents. These German-Brazilian cooperative arrangements include all subject areas 
contained in the Strategic Partnership. The framework that the EU provides to its member 
244“Anexo III da Resolução Nº 1 da Comissão Interministerial de Mudança Global do Clima. 
Contribuição do Projeto de Mitigação de Emissões de Metano na Produção de Carvão Vegetal da Plantar, 
Fevereiro 2007,” accessed March 1, 2014, http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0019/19345.pdf; “V&M do 
Brasil-Letter of Approval,” Federative Republic of Brazil Interministerial Commission on Global Climate 
Change, 2005. 
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states is almost completely utilized by the bilateral relations. The positive effects for 
Brazil and Germany characterize the effective cooperation. Sustained efforts are required 
on both sides to maintain the high level of consistency. 
From an environmental perspective, the strength of the economic objectives of the 
Strategic Partnership provides another starting point for criticism of the sustainable 
development. Due to the frequent mention of economic relations with Latin America, 
especially in the form of MERCOSUR, one cannot resist the impression that the Strategic 
Partnership between the EU and Brazil aims to get Europe closer to the business and 
commerce of MERCUSUR, and therefore, secure a share in the economic growth in 
Latin America. Furthermore, one may conclude that the environmental technical 
cooperation with Brazil is intended solely as a lever for economic access to 
MERCOSUR. Consequently, the seriousness on the EU side in the cooperation with 
Brazil must be questioned critically. Is the commitment to climate protection possibly 
only a cloak covering a desire for more intensive cooperation in the economic sphere? 
In particular, the regional and local effects in regard to economic inequalities, the 
fight against poverty, and air pollution tend to be negative. It must also be determined 
whether the objectives of environmental protection and economy do not adversely affect 
each other especially in the longer term. If there are gaps between the objectives, a 
common and simultaneous achievement of defined objectives cannot be realized. This 
area offers opportunities for further studies that focus on an assessment of competing or 
complementary goals of the Strategic Partnership. 
In summary, it can be stated that sustainable development objectives, as 
formulated in the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Brazil, are intended through 
CDM projects, but the fulfillment of these objectives cannot be verified. In order for them 
to be verifiable, the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Brazil must be fine-tuned 
to fit the distinctive priorities and negotiating postures of the two partners. This 
observation implies that the EU’s other strategic partnerships also fall short concerning 
sustainable development. Therefore, a comparison between the different Strategic 
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